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Note 
An Erie Silence: Erie Guesses and Their Effects 
on State Courts, Common Law, and 
Jurisdictional Federalism 
Connor Shaull* 
  INTRODUCTION  
Ricardo and Marisol Soto were stuck. In January 2017, the 
couple sued Swift Transportation Company in federal court1 for, 
among other things, its failure to properly select and retain its 
semitruck driver.2 On November 15, 2016, shortly after 10:00 
PM, Swift’s semitruck driver was traveling on I-90 near 
Luverne, Minnesota.3 The driver swerved into the median to 
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2020, University of Minnesota Law School.
B.A. (History and Political Science, 2017), Northwestern College (Iowa). I would 
like to thank the Minnesota Law Review staff and my advisors, David Hahn, 
Frances Fink, and Joshua Greenberg, for their guidance through my many 
drafts. I am grateful for Professors Brad Clary, Laura Thomas, and Christopher 
Soper for their patience and dedication towards better lawyering and legal writ-
ing. I feel the same gratitude for Franklin Guenthner and Mitchell Ness. I would 
also like to thank my incredible family: my mom for giving me acerbic wit; my 
dad for teaching me not to overuse it; and my sister, Brandi, and brother, Lance, 
for their unwavering support and for being the best older siblings I could hope 
for. I would like to thank my friends: Sam, Bryan, Corissa, Eric, Paige, Michelle, 
Jenna, and Stanton, who all gave me invaluable help as sage advisors and 
helped me eat leftover food from Sullivan’s at 3 PM. Shawn, “S Money,” 5-5-5-
6, thank you for providing the music since day one. And most of all, I would like 
to thank my incredible life partner, Hailey, and our daughter, Hazel, for giving 
me the greatest joy I could ever imagine. You two are simply the best and re-
mind me every day that I am the richest guy in the world. Copyright © 2019 by 
Connor Shaull. 
1. Soto v. Shealey, 331 F. Supp. 3d 879 (D. Minn. 2018). The Honorable
Chief Judge John Tunheim has granted the author, who was his judicial extern 
when Soto was written, permission to use Soto throughout this Note as is. 
2. Amended Complaint ¶¶ 26–48, Soto, 331 F. Supp. 3d 879 (Nov. 1, 2017)
(Civil No. 17-124), ECF no. 35). 
3. Id.
  
1134 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [104:1133 
 
avoid hitting six deer standing on the interstate, but in the pro-
cess, he overturned his trailer.4 The Sotos were driving behind 
the semitruck and collided with the underside of the trailer.5 
Specifically, the Sotos claimed Swift was negligent in its selec-
tion6 and retention7 of the semitruck driver.8 Although Minne-
sota law recognizes a direct-liability claim for negligent reten-
tion, it is silent regarding negligent selection.9 Consequently, 
Chief Judge John R. Tunheim of the Federal District Court of 
Minnesota was left unguided when interpreting state substan-
tive law simply because such law was nonexistent.10 Ultimately, 
the federal court recognized the negligent selection claim.11 In 
doing so, Judge Tunheim relied on prior Minnesota Supreme 
Court decisions and other common law while also considering 
how his decision may impose tensions on current state laws.12 
The Sotos therefore survived summary judgment on this issue 
and a new cause of action—negligent selection—obtained a foot-
hold in Minnesota. 
This practice—federal courts predicting how a state court 
would decide an unresolved issue—is commonly referred to as an 
Erie Guess.13 In other words, “[a]n ‘Erie Guess’ is an attempt to 
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 885 (“Negligent selection is the independent-contractor analogue
to the tort of negligent hiring in an employee-employer relationship . . . .”). 
7. See Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 911 (Minn. 1983) (recog-
nizing negligent retention as “an employer[s’] . . . duty to exercise reasonable 
care in view of all the circumstances in [retaining] individuals who, because of 
the employment, may pose a threat of injury to members of the public”). 
8. See Soto, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 883 (citing Amended Complaint, supra note
1, at ¶¶ 26–48). 
9. Id. at 885  (“The Minnesota Supreme Court has not expressly adopted
the tort of negligent selection.” (citing Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300, 
306 (Minn. 2007))). 
10. Id. (“The Minnesota Supreme Court has not expressly adopted the tort
of negligent selection. Thus, the Court must decide—pursuant to Erie—whether 
the Minnesota Supreme Court would recognize the tort of negligent selection of 
an independent contractor.”). 
11. Id.
12. Id. (quoting Larson, 738 N.W.2d at 304).
13. See, e.g., Haley N. Schaffer & David F. Herr, Why Guess? Erie Guesses
and the Eighth Circuit, 36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1625 (2010) (explaining the 
general background of Erie Guesses and arguing for certification of state law 
questions); Frank Chang, Note, You Have Not Because You Ask Not: Why Fed-
eral Courts Do Not Certify Questions of State Law to State Courts, 85 GEO. 
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predict what a state’s highest court would decide if it were to 
address the issue itself.”14 These federal interpretations include 
not only recognizing new causes of action, but also defining the 
particular elements of an existing cause of action.15 Some state 
courts are generally more receptive to Erie Guesses, while other 
states have a tendency to criticize and reject such federal projec-
tions. Missouri, for example, has disapproved of the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s Erie Guesses regarding the insurance industry16 and the 
secondary loan market.17 In contrast, Minnesota has approved 
federal interpretations of landmark tort actions—such as tor-
tious publication of private facts.18  
Erie Guesses are not a novel legal concept. Federal predic-
tions arising out of the Erie Doctrine19 and its progeny include 
federal predictions of how state courts will rule on novel causes 
of action, novel defenses, and even whether state precedent will 
be overruled.20 These predictions create an overlap between 
state and federal courts, and challenge the Erie Doctrine’s pur-
ported goals, which include “discouragement of forum-shopping 
WASH. L. REV. 251 (2017) (addressing the background of Erie Guesses and ar-
ticulating the argument against certification). 
14. Schaffer & Herr, supra note 13, at 1626.
15. See id.
16. See, e.g., Farmland Indus. v. Republic Ins. Co., 941 S.W.2d 505, 510
(Mo. 1997) (holding that the Eighth Circuit “misconstrue[d]” Missouri insurance 
law in Cont’l Ins. Cos. v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 842 F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir. 
1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988)). 
17. See Baker v. Century Fin. Grp., Inc., 554 S.W.3d 426, 435–36 (Mo. Ct.
App. 2018) (criticizing the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the Missouri Sec-
ond Mortgage Loan Act §§ 408.231–.241 in Rashaw v. United Consumers Credit 
Union, 685 F.3d 739 (8th Cir. 2012)). 
18. Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express, Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553, 555
(Minn. 2003) (upholding the federal district court’s Erie Guess regarding the 
elements of tortious publication of private fact in C.L.D. v. Wal-Mart Stores, 
Inc., 79 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1084–86 (D. Minn. 1999)). 
19. See generally Erie Doctrine, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019)
(defining this doctrine as “[t]he principle that a federal court exercising diver-
sity jurisdiction over a case that does not involve a federal question must apply 
the substantive law of the state where the court sits”). See generally infra Part 
III.A.
20. See generally Bradford R. Clark, Ascertaining the Laws of the Several
States: Positivism and Judicial Federalism After Erie, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1459, 
1495–1516 (1997) (explaining the history of Erie Guesses and providing several 
courts that have used Erie Guesses in the early 1990s). 
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and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws.”21 Not-
withstanding these contentions, Erie Guesses have existed since 
the Supreme Court created the Erie Doctrine eighty years ago22 
and continue to exist today.23  
This Note explores the Erie Guess’s history and practicality 
and investigates how states within the Eighth Circuit24 have 
generally responded to such predictions. Part I provides doctri-
nal background information on both the Erie Doctrine and the 
sub-category of Erie Guesses. That Part then explains how fed-
eral courts have applied Erie Guesses and how critics of Erie 
Guesses are calling for federal courts to employ alternative judi-
cial methods. Part II offers an empirical analysis that catego-
rizes how the highest state courts “respond” to the Eighth Circuit 
courts’25 Erie Guesses. This study categorizes the states’ re-
sponses into three groups: (1) states that agree with the Eighth 
Circuit; (2) states that acquiesce or do not respond to the Eighth 
Circuit; and (3) states that disagree with the Eighth Circuit.26 
Finally, Part III outlines the attributes of Erie Guesses that al-
low for federal courts to accurately predict state law and looks to 
the examples cited in Part II to prescribe solutions for federal 
courts forced to interpret legal questions vacant of state deci-
sions. Ultimately, because the vast majority of states within the 
Eighth Circuit either frequently validate or implicitly acquiesce 
to the federal court’s predictions, this Note proposes that federal 
courts continue interpreting novel state claims through Erie 
Guesses and argues that alternative methods, like mandatory 
21. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965). See generally Chang, supra
note 13, at 266–67 (noting that Erie Guesses raise constitutional problems be-
cause of the inequitable administration of justice associated with inconsistent 
holdings by different courts, along with the dilemma of federal courts interpret-
ing traditionally state-controlled areas). 
22. See West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236–37 (1940) (noting
that in the absence of clear state interpretations, federal courts must “ascertain 
from all the available data what the state law is”).  
23. See supra notes 1–11 and accompanying text.
24. Confining this analysis to the Eighth Circuit is a way of obtaining a
dataset with a manageable size while exploring a federal circuit with the second 
largest amount of states (seven) behind the Ninth Circuit, which has nine. 
25. Thus, the study focuses on the seven Supreme Courts of Arkansas,
Iowa, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota and the 
ten federal district courts of the Eighth Circuit. 
26. See infra Appendix Figure 1.
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certification or abstention, are antithetical to the Erie Doctrine’s 
main purposes. 
I. TRACING THE HISTORY OF THE ERIE DOCTRINE AND
ERIE GUESSES
In Erie, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]here is no federal
general common law.”27 This lesson taught to first-year law stu-
dents28 appears simple enough: federal courts, when applying 
any substantive state law, must defer to the respective state’s 
highest court.29 However, the Erie Doctrine’s purposes are much 
more difficult to grasp. Indeed, both state and federal courts 
have debated the Erie Doctrine’s purposes since its inception, 
which has shaped how contemporary courts view and apply the 
Erie Doctrine.30 Among such issues that Erie did not explicitly 
address itself are Erie Guesses. Thus, Erie’s progeny have influ-
enced what an Erie Guess exactly is and when such federal pre-
dictions are appropriate. Section A of this Part provides some 
background on the Erie Doctrine and context in which this doc-
trine arose. Section B then discusses how and when Erie Guesses 
have been applied and two alternative methods that seek to side-
step issues posed by Erie Guesses: discretionary abstention and 
mandatory certification. 
27. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (citing Balt. & Ohio R.R.
Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting)). 
28. This is, of course, one of many lessons that the complex Erie doctrine
entails. See generally Rogelio Lasso, From the Paper Chase to the Digital Chase: 
Technology and the Challenge of Teaching 21st Century Law Students, 43 
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1, 40 n.207 (2002) (“Proximate cause in torts and the Erie 
doctrine in civil procedure . . . are two concepts most students seldom compre-
hend on the first try.”). 
29. See generally BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 19 (defining the
Erie Doctrine). 
30. Compare Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 536–
38 (1958) (noting that the Erie doctrine’s main purpose was to avoid “forum 
shopping”), with Guar. Tr. Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945) (“In essence, the 
intent of [Erie] was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is exercising 
jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties, the out-
come of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same, so 
far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in 
a State court.”). See generally Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (“[The] 
twin aims of the Erie rule [are] discouragement of forum-shopping and avoid-
ance of inequitable administration of the laws.”). 
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A.  THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE ERIE DOCTRINE: DEFINING THE
JUDICIARY’S BOUNDARIES SURROUNDING STATE LAW
The separation of powers between the judicial branch and 
the executive and legislative branches is perhaps most deline-
ated31 by issues involving Article III of the United States Consti-
tution, which established a “limited” judiciary.32 The Constitu-
tion limits the judicial power to “cases” or “controversies,”33 and 
Congress has the authority to define the judiciary’s proper role 
through the “Exceptions and Regulations Clause.”34 Still, and 
perhaps ironically, the Supreme Court has historically deter-
mined what the Constitution specifically invests in Congress.35 
In other words, because the Supreme Court has the final say on 
Constitutional interpretations,36 it is the ultimate decider of how 
much power Congress actually has through the “Exceptions and 
Regulations Clause.” Notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s pre-
rogative, Congress and the Supreme Court itself are tradition-
ally suspicious37 of the judiciary’s unique undemocratic threat.38 
31. See, e.g., Daimler Chrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341–42, (2006)
(“[N]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper role in our system 
of government than the constitutional limitation of federal-court jurisdiction to 
actual cases or controversies.” (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 
(1997))).  
32. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546–47 (2016) (quoting U.S
CONST. art. III, §§ 1–2). 
33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
34. Id. §§ 1–2 (emphasis added) (“The judicial [p]ower of the United States,
shall be vested in one [S]upreme Court, and in such inferior [c]ourts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish . . . [T]he Supreme Court shall 
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and 
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”).  
35. Compare id. (noting that Congress can except certain classes of cases
from the federal courts), and United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. 128 (1872) (holding 
that Congress has the right to change the law), with Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, 
514 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1995) (holding that Congress cannot interfere with Arti-
cle III prerogatives or override judicial action in a particular case). 
36. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphati-
cally the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”). 
37. See Martin H. Redish & Sopan Joshi, Litigating Article III Standing: A
Proposed Solution to the Serious (but Unrecognized) Separation of Powers Prob-
lem, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1373, 1386 (2014) (“[C]ommonly, . . . [C]ongressional 
grants of jurisdiction are stricter than what the Constitution permits.”). 
38. See id. at 1381 (“[C]ourts have the ability to invalidate democratically
enacted legislation without being democratically accountable themselves . . . .”). 
But see THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 464 (Alexander Hamilton) (noting that “the 
judiciary is beyond comparison the weakest of the three departments of power” 
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The Supreme Court therefore has strictly interpreted both Arti-
cle III and congressional definitions of the federal courts’ author-
ity to limit its jurisdiction.39  
A quintessential example of such limitations is the Supreme 
Court’s eventually broad40 interpretation in Erie of the Judiciary 
Act of 1789.41 In relevant part, this Act was Congress’s attempt 
to define federal courts’ authority to rule on matters involving 
state law. The Act stated: “[t]hat the laws of the several states, 
except where the constitution, treaties or statutes of the United 
States shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as 
rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of the 
United States in cases where they apply.”42 In sum, the Judici-
ary Act mandated that federal courts must defer to state “rules 
of decision.”43 The Supreme Court’s interpretation regarding 
whether such “rules of decision” included state common law has 
changed over the years, but ultimately, the Court has narrowed 
federal courts’ jurisdiction by including state common law in the 
Judiciary Act.44 
Pre-Erie, the Supreme Court determined in the 1842 case of 
Swift v. Tyson that such “rules of decision” included only state 
legislative action, not state common law.45 Swift narrowly inter-
preted the Judiciary Act of 1789 to apply only to “local statutes 
and local usages of the character before stated, and [not] . . . to 
because it can act only when called (citing 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE 
SPIRIT OF LAWS 181 (Thomas Ruddiman 1793) (1748))). 
39. For example, see the Court’s interpretation of “standing” as a jurisdic-
tional requirement. Jordan Z. Dillon, Standing on the Wrong Foot: The Seventh 
Circuit’s Eccentric Attempt to Rescue Risk-Based Standing in Data Breach Liti-
gation, 56 WASHBURN L.J. 123, 128, 128 n.41 (2017) (“Though [Article III] of the 
Constitution does not contain the actual phrases ‘standing’ or ‘injury-in-fact,’ 
these concepts flowed naturally from its language limiting the court’s power to 
cases and controversies.” (citing Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60 
(1992))). 
40. In traditional legal complexity, a broad interpretation of the Judiciary
Act actually caused more limits on the judiciary because the relevant statutory 
provision mandated when federal courts must defer to state law. Lujan, 504 
U.S. at 559–60. 
41. Rules of Decision Act, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012)). 
42. 28 U.S.C. § 1652.
43. Id.
44. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73–74 (1938).
45. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), overruled by Erie, 304 U.S. at
79.
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contracts and other instruments of a commercial nature.”46 
Thus, Swift effectively allowed federal courts to rule inde-
pendently on matters of common law and consequently under-
mine conflicting state courts’ interpretations of common law 
principles.47 Indeed, in the years following Swift, several cases 
epitomized such unintended consequences of widening the fed-
eral courts’ power. Notably, in Black & White Taxicab Co. v. 
Brown & Yellow Taxicab Co., the plaintiff Kentucky taxi corpo-
ration sought to execute an agreement with a railroad company 
in which the taxi corporation would have a monopoly on solicit-
ing passengers at the corresponding railroad station.48 Because 
Kentucky’s highest court held such an agreement was illegal un-
der Kentucky common law,49 the plaintiff taxi corporation dis-
solved and reincorporated in Tennessee, where such an agree-
ment was legal.50 Relying on Swift,51 the Supreme Court upheld 
the disputed agreement, which allowed the plaintiff to circum-
vent the relevant state law.52 Hence, this case demonstrated the 
ability of plaintiffs to “forum shop” via the Swift Doctrine and 
successfully determine the case’s outcome solely by bringing suit 
in a different jurisdiction.53 Black & White Taxicab also revealed 
the problem of inconsistent verdicts between federal and state 
courts, which inherently harm judicial fairness and finality.54  
After almost a century of such forum shopping and incon-
sistent verdicts, the Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice 
46. Id. at 18–19.
47. Cf. Erie, 304 U.S. at 73–74 (criticizing the unintended consequences of
Swift). 
48. 276 U.S. 518, 522–24 (1928).
49. Id. at 526 (citing Palmer Transfer Co. v. Anderson, 115 S.W. 182, 182
(Ky. 1909)). 
50. Id. at 523.
51. Id. at 530 (citing Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842)).
52. Id. at 532 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority “went
its own way regardless of the Courts of this State”). 
53. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 73 (1938) (describing Black
& White Taxicab and the ability of the plaintiff to prevail solely because of the 
jurisdiction that the actions were brought (citing Black & White Taxicab, 276 
U.S. at 530)). 
54. See generally Brainerd Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits
of the Bernhard doctrine, 9 STAN. L. REV. 281, 304 (1957) (explaining through 
his pedagogical “train victim hypothetical” how inconsistent verdicts inherently 
harm fairness in the judicial process in the context of mutual claim preclusion). 
2019] AN ERIE SILENCE 1141 
Louis Brandeis, overruled Swift sua sponte55 in the landmark 
case: Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.56 Erie broadly interpreted 
the Judiciary Act to include state general common law,57 which 
restricted the federal courts’ powers.58 Relevantly, in Erie, the 
Supreme Court reconsidered the Judiciary Act of 1789.59 Similar 
to both Swift and Black & White Taxicab, Erie involved an indi-
vidual who did not have a solid common law claim in state court, 
but used federal “general common law” as a more favorable land-
scape.60 The federal district court in Erie ignored state common 
law and instead applied a higher standard of care, which the 
Second Circuit affirmed.61 The Supreme Court reversed, holding 
that such federal general common law applications were uncon-
stitutional.62 Perhaps infamously, the majority never specified 
what part of the Constitution Swift violated, which has led to 
more debates surrounding Erie’s purposes.63 Erie was explicit, 
55. Latin for “of one’s accord; voluntarily,” in the judicial context this term
generally means “[w]ithout prompting or suggestion; on its own motion.” Sua 
Sponte, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).  
56. 304 U.S. at 74 (“Experience in applying the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson,
had revealed its defects, political and social; and the benefits expected to flow 
from the rule did not accrue.”). 
57. Id. at 71 (holding that, in matters of general jurisprudence, the Judici-
ary Act’s phrase “laws of the several states” includes “the unwritten law of the 
State as declared by its highest court”). 
58. Id. at 78 (“Congress has no power to declare substantive rules of com-
mon law applicable in a State . . . [a]nd no clause in the Constitution purports 
to confer such a power upon the federal courts.”). 
59. Id. at 71 (citing Rules of Decision Act, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34,
1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012))). 
60. The plaintiff in Erie was struck by the defendant train company’s train
and thus, his arm was severed. Id. at 69; see also David L. Stebenne, Reining in 
the Federal Judiciary: Louis D. Brandeis and Erie v. Tompkins, 29 REVS. AM. 
HIST. 93, 93 (2001) (book review). However, because the plaintiff was a tres-
passer, the defendant was only liable if it inflicted “willful or wanton injury.” 
Id. at 80 (citing Falchetti v. Pa. R.R. Co., 160 A. 859, 860 (Pa. 1932)). The plain-
tiff therefore sued the defendant in federal court, hoping for a broader duty, 
which was ultimately applied by the lower courts. Id. at 70. 
61. Tompkins v. Erie R.R. Co., 90 F.2d 603, 603–04 (2d Cir. 1937).
62. Erie, 304 U.S. at 79 (“[Swift is] ‘an unconstitutional assumption of pow-
ers by courts of the United States which no lapse of time or respectable array of 
opinion should make us hesitate to correct.’” (quoting Black & White Taxicab & 
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 
(1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting))). 
63. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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however, that “there is no federal general common law” and fed-
eral “[s]upervision over either the legislative or the judicial ac-
tion of the States is in no case permissible except as to matters 
by the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the 
United States.”64 Therefore, federal courts dealing with substan-
tive state law—including general common law—must defer to 
the highest state court’s decision.65 Such deference does not ap-
ply to “procedural matters, constitutional issues, or matters spe-
cifically governed by acts of Congress.”66 Notwithstanding such 
exceptions, the Erie Doctrine has clearly served as a strong indi-
cator that Congress—via the Judiciary Act of 178967—limited 
federal courts’ ability to undermine state decisions in both state 
statutory and common law contexts.68 
In sum, Congress has the power to define the scope of federal 
courts through the Exceptions and Regulations Clause.69 Thus, 
Congress is ultimately the final voice on what “cases or contro-
versies” federal courts may hear and the Supreme Court has typ-
ically respected this power.70 Erie followed this trend as the 
Court delineated the federal judiciary’s power regarding state 
law. 
64. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78–79 (emphasis added) (quoting Balt. & Ohio R.R.
Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting)). 
65. Id. at 78 (holding that federal courts have “no power to declare substan-
tive rules of common law applicable in a State”). 
66. Schaffer & Herr, supra note 13, at 1625. See generally Erie, 304 U.S. at
78 (holding that “[e]xcept in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by 
acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the [s]tate”). 
67. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (2012)). 
68. Erie, 304 U.S. at 86 (Butler, J., dissenting) (“Evidently Congress has
intended throughout the years that the rule of decision as construed should con-
tinue to govern federal courts in trials at common law.”). See generally Clark, 
supra note 20, at 1461–62 (explaining the Erie doctrine’s history and its pur-
poses regarding jurisdictional federalism). 
69. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added) (“[T]he supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and 
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.”).  
70. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1869) (noting that
Congress can except certain classes of cases from the federal courts). 
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B. ERIE’S PROGENY AND THE ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF
ABSTENTION AND CERTIFICATION
Although Erie held that federal courts should defer to state 
general common law, it did not explicitly address what the fed-
eral courts should do if the highest state court has not addressed 
the question of state law at issue. The Supreme Court and lower 
federal courts have attempted to address this issue through Erie 
Guesses. Regardless, courts and scholars have advocated for the 
Erie Guess’s demise by endorsing and employing abstention and 
certification procedures. This Section will first analyze the 
caselaw surrounding such federal predictions before describing 
these alternative methods and the momentum they have gained. 
1. Erie Guesses Are Influenced by a Variety of Precedential
Factors and Occur in a Variety of Contexts.
Post-Erie Supreme Court decisions have interpreted the 
Erie Doctrine to require a response to two main questions: (1) is 
state law involved in the case or controversy; and (2) has the 
state’s highest court ruled on this issue.71 If a federal court sit-
ting in diversity,72 supplemental,73 or even bankruptcy74 juris-
diction answers both questions affirmatively, then such state de-
cisions are binding on the federal courts. For example, in Butner 
v. United States, the Supreme Court held that because “Congress
has generally left the determination of property rights in the as-
sets of a bankrupt’s estate to state law,” the federal courts should
defer to relevant state decisions.75 Similarly, in United Mine
Workers v. Gibbs, the Supreme Court cautioned federal courts
that they are “bound to apply state law to [state claims in sup-
plemental jurisdiction].”76
Erie’s progeny have addressed what a federal court should 
do if state law is involved in the case or controversy but the 
state’s highest court has not ruled on the disputed issue. Such 
71. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958).
72. See, e.g., Erie, 304 U.S. 64 (adjudicating a suit between a Pennsylvanian
plaintiff and defendant, a New York corporation). 
73. See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966) (providing
an example of Erie being applied in supplemental jurisdiction). 
74. See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48 (1979) (applying Erie
within the context of bankruptcy proceedings). 
75. Id. at 54.
76. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726.
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matters of “unclear state law”77 include: issues that are of “first 
impression”;78 conflicting interpretations from the state’s inter-
mediate appellate courts;79 and situations where the federal 
court anticipates that the state court would overturn its own 
precedent.80 In situations involving this ambiguity, the Supreme 
Court has held that a federal court should “apply what [it] find[s] 
to be the state law after giving ‘proper regard’ to relevant rulings 
of other courts of the [s]tate.”81 The Supreme Court has also 
made clear that a federal court ought not disregard a “rule of 
law” announced by an intermediate appellate state court “unless 
[the federal court] is convinced by other persuasive data that the 
highest court of the state would decide otherwise.”82 Soto v. 
Shealey implicitly applied this final principle when the federal 
court required an employee’s conduct to be within the scope of 
her employment for a plaintiff to succeed on a claim of negligent 
hiring or retention.83 Although the Minnesota Supreme Court 
had not ruled on this element, a state appellate court had affirm-
atively rejected such a requirement in M.L. v. Magnuson.84 De-
spite the intermediate court’s position, the federal court held 
77. See generally Chang, supra note 13, at 263–65 (discussing examples of
“unclear state law”). 
78. See, e.g., id. at 264 n.111 (“[S]tate law [was] unclear because the Mary-
land Court of Appeals has not yet had the chance to construe the terms in the 
applicable state statute.” (citing Gardner v. Ally Fin. Inc., 488 F. App’x 709, 713 
(4th Cir. 2012))). 
79. See, e.g., id. at 264 n.115 (“[S]tate law [was] unclear as to ‘whether the
insurance contracts’ anti-assignment clauses bar post-loss assignments to the 
State’ because there was no precedent from the Louisiana Supreme Court and 
intermediate courts conflicted with each other.” (quoting In re Katrina Canal 
Breaches Litig., 613 F.3d 504, 509–10 (5th Cir. 2010))). 
80. See, e.g., id. at 264 n.117 (“[S]tate law [was] unclear because the court
questioned whether the Alabama Supreme Court would grant absolute immun-
ity for jailers . . . .” (citing LeFrere v. Quezada, 582 F.3d 1260, 1268 (11th Cir. 
2009))). 
81. Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
82. West v.  Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 235 (1940); see also N.Y. Life
Ins. Co. v. Stoner, 109 F.2d 874, 878 (8th Cir. 1940) (stating that “[w]e are not 
bound to follow the decisions and reasoning of the intermediate appellate courts 
of Missouri”), rev’d, 311 U.S. 464 (1940). 
83. Soto v. Shealey, 331 F. Supp. 3d 879, 884–85 (D. Minn. 2018).
84. 531 N.W. 2d 849, 857 n.4 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (ruling that that the
employee’s conduct did not have to occur within the scope of her employment for 
the plaintiff to prevail on a negligent hiring claim). Soto did not rely explicitly 
on this principle because its facts turned on another element of Negligent Hiring 
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that there was enough “evidence” that the state Supreme Court 
would require the “inside the scope” element if it was confronted 
with this issue.85  
Notwithstanding such direction from the Supreme Court, 
disputes remain regarding how federal courts should make Erie 
Guesses and what “evidence” courts should rely on when making 
these predictions. Some federal district courts appear to rely 
more on intermediate state court decisions, even if these deci-
sions conflict with existing federal court holdings.86 Other fed-
eral courts apply a more flexible and broader standard. The 
Third Circuit, for example, in Jackman v. Equitable Life Assur-
ance Society, ruled that: “In order to apply local law where there 
is no authoritative local decision or statute, . . . a federal court 
[must] ascertain and apply what it believes to be the law which a 
court, authorized to speak the law of the particular [s]tate, would 
apply.”87 In contrast, other federal courts have applied a more 
rigid, yet holistic review. For example, the Minnesota Federal 
District Court has held that the Minnesota Supreme Court relies 
on four specific factors when deciding whether to recognize a 
common law tort:  
(1) whether the tort is inherent in, or the natural extension of, a well-
established common law right, (2) whether the tort has been recognized
in other common law states, (3) whether recognition of a cause of action
will create tension with other applicable laws, and (4) whether such
tension is out-weighed by the importance of the additional protections
that recognition of the claim would provide to injured persons.88
and Retention. Soto, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 884–85 (holding that the plaintiffs can-
not state a claim for negligent hiring and retention because they did not allege 
that the defendant committed an intentional tort). Nonetheless, it is a common 
and longstanding principle that federal courts can ignore lower state courts only 
if there is sufficient evidence that the higher court would rule contrarily. See 
West v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223, 235 (1940). 
85. Soto, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 884–85.
86. See, e.g., Holden Farms, Inc. v. Hog Slat, Inc., 347 F.3d 1055, 1066 (8th
Cir. 2003) (applying an intervening decision from state intermediate court of 
appeals rather than contrary Eighth Circuit precedent); cf. Freeman v. MH 
Equip. Co., No. 4:15CV1473, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 57901, at *5–6 (E.D. Mo. 
May 2, 2016) (focusing on the “Missouri Court of Appeals’ decision . . . because 
the Missouri Supreme Court ha[d] not yet spoke[n] on the issue”).  
87. Jackman v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 145 F.2d 945, 947 (3d Cir.
1944) (emphasis added). 
88. Soto, 331 F. Supp. 3d at 885 (quoting Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d
300, 304 (Minn. 2007)). 
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Specifically, the Eighth Circuit has held that federal courts 
should consider “relevant state precedent, analogous decisions, 
considered dicta, . . . and any other reliable data.”89 Eight of the 
other district courts within the Eighth Circuit have also applied 
this approach.90 Another district court, the District of Nebraska, 
has applied a similar approach, although with less explicit fac-
tors.91 The absence of clear guidance from the Supreme Court92 
on how federal courts should apply Erie Guesses has resulted in 
the circuits using Erie Guesses slightly differently. Still, the ma-
jority of circuits have implemented Erie Guesses since the Erie 
Doctrine’s inception and inherently clarified how such predic-
tions are to be applied.93 
89. Lindsay Mfg. Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 118 F.3d 1263,
1267–68 (8th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ventura v. Titan Sports, Inc., 65 F.3d 725, 729 
(8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1174 (1996)). 
90. Cedar Rapids Lodge & Suites, LLC v. JFS Dev., Inc., No. 09-CV-175-
LRR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42273, at *10 (N.D. Iowa July 19, 2010); Mahony 
v. Universal Pediatric Servs., 753 F. Supp. 2d 839, 852 n.8 (S.D. Iowa 2010);
Hoff v. Elkhorn Bar, 613 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1149 (D.N.D. 2009); Auto-Owners
Ins. Co. v. Mid-America Piping, No. 4:07-CV-00394, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
26038, at *4–5 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2008) (quoting Lindsay, 118 F.3d at 1267);
Crussell v. Electrolux Home Prods., 499 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1138–39 (W.D. Ark.
2007); Meredith v. Buchman, 101 F. Supp. 2d 764, 767 (E.D. Ark. 2000); Brown
v. Youth Servs. Int’l of S.D., Inc., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1100 (D.S.D. 2000); cf.
Trilogy Dev. Co. v. BB Syndication Servs., 437 B.R. 683, 685 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
2010).
91. Cudahy Co. v. Am. Labs., Inc., 313 F. Supp. 1339, 1342 (D. Neb. 1970)
(“It is also generally the rule that in the absence of state law a federal court 
should make use of all available data on the questions involved, including re-
statements and treatises and where appropriate may assume state law will fol-
low the majority rule.”). 
92. Clark, supra note 20, at 1517 (“[T]he Court has neither squarely en-
dorsed [Erie Guesses] nor suggested that such an approach is the exclusive 
means that federal courts must employ to resolve unsettled questions of state 
law.”). 
93. See, e.g., LeFrere v. Quezada, 582 F.3d 1260, 1268 (11th Cir. 2009) (us-
ing an Erie Guess to ascertain how Alabama courts would rule on absolute im-
munity for jailers); Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Mallard Mfg. Corp., 707 F.2d 351 (8th 
Cir. 1983) (applying Nebraska law in adjudicating a breach of contract claim); 
Stafford v. Int’l Harvester Co., 668 F.2d 142, 148 (2d Cir. 1981) (employing an 
Erie Guess in a suit between Pennsylvanian plaintiffs and a defendant New 
York company); Jackman v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y, 145 F.2d 945, 947 
(3d Cir. 1944) (“[A] federal court [must] ascertain and apply what it believes to 
be the law which a court, authorized to speak the law of the particular state, 
would apply.”).  
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Contextually, these federal predictions include how state 
courts will rule in a variety of settings.94 First, post-Erie caselaw 
has upheld the practice of federal courts making predictions of 
how state courts will interpret novel causes of action95 and novel 
defenses.96 Second, post-Erie caselaw has upheld the practice of 
federal courts predicting that state courts will overrule existing 
precedent.97 
For example, in DeWeerth v. Baldinger,98 a federal district 
court assumed that a state law defense was not satisfied, alt-
hough the state itself had not ruled on the subject.99 The Second 
Circuit reversed because the case presented an “unresolved state 
law issue.”100 The Second Circuit noted: “When presented with 
an absence of controlling state authority, we must ‘make an es-
timate of what the state’s highest court would rule to be its 
law.’”101 Ultimately, the circuit court relied on policy considera-
tions and the law of other jurisdictions102 in its finding that a 
valid defense was present.103 The United States Supreme Court 
denied certiorari.104 Interestingly, in Solomon R. Guggenheim 
Foundation v. Lubell,105 the New York Court of Appeals rejected 
the federally-established defense and held that the Second Cir-
cuit’s rule was incorrect.106 Notwithstanding this rejection by the 
94. See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text. See generally Clark, su-
pra note 20, at 1495–516 (explaining the history of Erie Guesses and providing 
several courts that have used Erie Guesses in the early 1990s). 
95. See supra notes 115–25 and accompanying text. Another valuable
source that details such federal “predictions” of novel state law is 19 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4507 (3d ed. 2018). 
96. See generally Clark, supra note 20, at 1508–14 (describing several cases
in which federal courts recognized and upheld novel defenses). 
97. See generally id. at 1514–17 (describing several cases in which federal
courts overturned state law). 
98. 658 F. Supp. 688 (S.D.N.Y.), rev’d, 836 F.2d 103 (2d Cir. 1987).
99. See id. at 698.
100. DeWeerth, 836 F.2d at 108 n.5.
101. Id. at 108 (quoting Stafford v. International Harvester Co., 668 F.2d
142, 148 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
102. Id. (“In making that determination, this Court may consider all of the
resources that the New York Court of Appeals could use, including New York’s 
stated policies and the law of other jurisdictions.” (citation omitted)). 
103. Id. at 112.
104. DeWeerth v. Baldinger, 486 U.S. 1056 (1988) (denying petition for writ
of certiorari). 
105. 569 N.E.2d 426 (N.Y. 1991).
106. See id. at 431 (noting that the Second Circuit’s defense unjustly
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state court, the Second Circuit reaffirmed its decision to recog-
nize the defense when DeWeerth v. Baldinger came up to the 
court again on a second appeal.107 The Second Circuit admitted 
it was wrong, but nonetheless, upheld its original decision be-
cause of the nature of the United States’ “dual justice system.”108 
The federal court explained that: “The very nature of diversity 
jurisdiction leaves open the possibility that a state court will 
subsequently disagree with a federal court’s interpretation of 
state law.”109 Regarding Erie, the court noted that “[t]here is 
nothing in Erie that suggests that consistency must be achieved 
at the expense of finality, or that federal cases finally disposed 
of must be revisited anytime an unrelated state case clarifies the 
applicable rules of law.”110 In other words, the court held that 
Erie does not require absolute harmonization among federal and 
state courts.111 That is, state courts are free to disagree with fed-
eral interpretations of state law and federal courts are not re-
quired to retroactively change a particular case result based on 
clarifying state decisions.112 Even though the federal court was 
ultimately incorrect in its prediction of a novel state defense, 
Baldinger provides an excellent example of a federal court inter-
preting novel state defenses when the state court was silent and 
the state thereafter rejecting the federal courts’ guess.113 
Post-Erie caselaw has also upheld the practice of federal 
courts predicting that state courts will overrule existing prece-
dent.114 For example, Meredith v. City of Winter Haven presented 
a question of state law that involved a Florida city’s bond repay-
ments.115 The federal district court granted the city’s motion to 
dismiss despite evidence suggesting the Florida Supreme Court 
“place[s] the burden of locating stolen artwork on the true owner . . . [which] 
encourage[s] illicit trafficking in stolen art”). 
107. 38 F.3d 1266, 1269 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that the district court
“abused its discretion in ordering relief from the final judgment based on Rule 
60(b)”). 
108. Id. at 1274.
109. Id. at 1273–74.
110. Id. at 1274.
111. Id. at 1272.
112. Id. at 1272–73.
113. Id. at 1273–74.
114. See generally Clark, supra note 20, at 1514–17 (describing several cases
in which federal courts overturned state law). 
115. 320 U.S. 228, 233 (1943).
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would overrule its prior decisions.116 The Fifth Circuit declined 
to exercise its jurisdiction because the state law was unset-
tled.117 On appeal, the petitioners claimed the U.S. Supreme 
Court should reverse on the basis that the current state law is 
“inconsistent with earlier decisions of the Supreme Court of Flor-
ida.”118 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court remanded 
and ordered the lower court to apply an Erie Guess “predictive” 
approach.119 Specifically, the Court held that “the rulings of the 
Supreme Court of Florida” are not controlling if “it can be said 
with some assurance that the Florida Supreme Court will not 
follow them in the future.”120  
Likewise, in Mason v. American Emery Wheel Works, the 
First Circuit held that the Mississippi Supreme Court121 would 
“reconsider and revise” its past decisions “whenever it may have 
before it a case that squarely presents the issue.”122 The First 
Circuit explained that the Mississippi Supreme Court “indi-
cate[d] its awareness of the modern trend in the area,” but it 
“was able to dispose of the particular issue on another ground 
without the necessity of expressly overruling its earlier deci-
sion.”123 After nine years, this federal prediction proved true 
when the Mississippi Supreme Court overruled its previous de-
cision.124 Although these federal predictions are more conten-
tious because of the inherent power they give to federal courts,125 
116. Id. at 230.
117. Id. at 229.
118. Id. at 233.
119. See id. at 234 (explaining how the federal court should determine if the
state court is likely to overrule itself). 
120. Id. The case was ultimately remanded because of the Fifth Circuit’s re-
fusal to exercise its jurisdiction “on the ground that decision of the case on the 
merits turned on questions of Florida constitutional and statutory law which 
the decisions of the Florida courts had left in a state of uncertainty.” Id. at 229. 
121. Mason provides an interesting, albeit not necessarily rare, example of
a federal court ascertaining the laws of a state that is not within its direct ju-
risdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2012) (establishing the First Circuit as presiding 
over Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Puerto Rico, and Rhode Island). 
122. Mason v. Am. Emery Wheel Works, 241 F.2d 906, 910 (1st Cir. 1957).
123. Id. at 909. (relying on E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Ladner, 73 So.
2d 249, 254–55 (Miss. 1954)). 
124. State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113, 118 (Miss. 1966) (over-
ruling Ford Motor Co. v. Myers, 117 So. 362 (Miss. 1928)). 
125. See Clark, supra note 20, at 1515 (“For nine years (from 1957 to 1966),
federal courts recognized and applied ‘substantive rules of common law’ that 
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federal courts continue to exercise such Erie Guesses to ensure 
they are applying accurate state law. 
In sum, since Erie, federal district and appellate courts have 
interpreted the Erie Doctrine to allow them considerable discre-
tion to decide matters of unclear state law. This discretion in-
cludes recognizing novel causes of action and novel defenses and 
predicting that the state supreme court will overrule past deci-
sions. Therefore, federal courts have provided a strong precedent 
of implementing and upholding Erie Guesses. 
2. The Alternative Methods: Critics of Erie Guesses Advocate
for Alternatives Including Abstention and Certification
Procedures
Despite such precedent, critics of Erie Guesses have gravi-
tated towards alternative procedures including abstention and 
certification.126 Like Erie Guesses, both alternatives are also 
rooted in precedent and based on supporting the Erie Doctrine’s 
purposes.127 For example, three years after Erie, in Railroad 
Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., the Supreme Court recog-
nized the problem of federal courts incorrectly predicting state 
law, that it inherently created inconsistent verdicts.128 The 
Court realized that: “Obeying Erie is straightforward if state law 
Mississippi had yet to adopt (and might have never adopted).” (quoting Erie 
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938))).  
126. Critics have also advocated for a “static approach” where federal courts
“‘rule upon state law as it presently exists’ rather than ‘surmis[ing] or sug-
gest[ing] its expansion.’” Clark, supra note 20, at 1535 (alterations in original) 
(quoting Tritle v. Crown Airways, Inc., 928 F.2d 81, 84 (4th Cir. 1990) (per cu-
riam)). However, such proponents generally prefer certification because it 
“avoids the ‘political and social’ defects associated with [the static approach] by 
reducing both the incentives for forum shopping and the potential for inequita-
ble administration of the law.” Id. at 1544. Indeed, “the static approach may 
lead federal courts to continue to apply existing rules of decision even after state 
courts are prepared to abandon them.” Id. at 1541. 
127. See generally Chang, supra note 13, at 267 (“Certification allows federal
courts to avoid Erie problems regarding federalism, forum shopping, and ineq-
uitable administration of justice.”); Clark, supra note 20, at 1517–24 (explaining 
the historical development of the abstention doctrine); Schaffer & Herr, supra 
note 13, at 1627 (arguing that “[c]ertification grew out of the Supreme Court 
decision in Erie”). 
128. R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (noting that Erie
Guesses, at times, create “needless friction with [the] state”). See generally 
Schaffer & Herr, supra note 13, at 1628–29 (discussing the creation of the “ab-
stention doctrine” and its purposes of avoiding inconsistent verdicts). 
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is clear, but predicting how the state supreme court would decide 
an unclear issue is neither easy nor value-free. For unsettled is-
sues implicating state policy, a federal court’s Erie-based predic-
tion creates ‘needless friction with [the] state.’”129 Thus, in Pull-
man, the Supreme Court created an “abstention” option for 
federal courts.130 This discretionary doctrine allows “a federal 
court, in narrow circumstances, [to] refuse to decide a case in-
volving unclear issues of state law when a decision on the state 
law issue might raise a federal constitutional question.”131 Spe-
cifically, Pullman explained that “abstention [is] appropri-
ate . . . whereby the federal courts, exercising a wise discretion, 
restrain their authority because of scrupulous regard for the 
rightful independence of the state governments and for the 
smooth working of the federal judiciary.”132  
Proponents of abstention emphasize that Supreme Court 
opinions merely “contain dicta suggesting that federal courts 
should employ a predictive approach” and that “the Court has 
neither squarely endorsed that model nor suggested that such 
an approach is the exclusive means that federal courts must em-
ploy to resolve unsettled questions of state law.”133 In contrast, 
the Court, at times, has required federal courts to abstain from 
deciding unsettled questions of state law.134 Further, advocates 
contend that because abstention avoids federal courts interpret-
ing state law, this avenue has the ability “to avoid the potential 
for inequitable administration of the law.”135 Abstention is also 
129. Eric Eisenberg, Note, A Divine Comity: Certification (At Last) in North
Carolina, 58 DUKE L.J. 69, 73 (2008) (quoting Pullman, 312 U.S. at 500). 
130. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501.
131. Richard Alan Chase, Note, A State Court’s Refusal to Answer Certified
Questions: Are Inferences Permitted?, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 407, 411–12 (1992). 
132. Pullman, 312 U.S. at 501.
133. Clark, supra note 20, at 1517.
134. See, e.g., Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943) (requiring the
federal court to “leave these problems of Texas law to the State court where each 
may be handled as one more item in a continuous series of adjustments” (inter-
nal quotations omitted)); Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 
483–84 (1940) (mandating the federal court to submit the question of unsettled 
state law to the corresponding state courts). 
135. Clark, supra note 20, at 1520 (citing La. Power & Light Co. v. City of
Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 26 (1959)). 
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supported by the Erie Doctrine’s purpose to avoid “forum shop-
ping”136 because, in theory, parties will not be incentivized to 
bring novel state claims in federal court if the federal courts are 
unlikely to rule on such issues. 
Another alternative to Erie Guesses is certification, which 
allows “federal courts to receive instruction from a state’s su-
preme court about unsettled questions of state law while avoid-
ing the expense and delay associated with abstention.”137 Certi-
fication is “[a] procedure by which a federal appellate court 
asks . . . the highest state court to review a question of law aris-
ing in a case pending before the appellate court and on which it 
needs guidance.”138 Courts were slow to accept certification.139 
For example, Florida, in 1945, “authorize[d] its state supreme 
court to adopt rules for accepting questions certified from federal 
courts.”140 Regardless of this opportunity, “the Florida Supreme 
Court did not accept the legislature’s invitation to create a certi-
fication rule for fifteen years.”141 Similarly, other state and fed-
eral appellate courts were reluctant to use such certification pro-
cedures until the Supreme Court, in Clay v. Sun Insurance Office 
Ltd., suggested that the Fifth Circuit should “certify . . . [a] ques-
tion of state law to the Supreme Court of Florida.”142 Signifi-
cantly, the Supreme Court frequently used certification itself143 
and opined that certification is more efficient and effective than 
136. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (noting that one of the Erie
doctrine’s aims was the “discouragement of ‘forum-shopping’”). 
137. Schaffer & Herr, supra note 13, at 1628–29.
138. Certification, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
139. Michael Klotz, Comment, Avoiding Inconsistent Interpretations: United
States v. Kelly, the Fourth Circuit, and the Need for a Certification Procedure in 
North Carolina, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1173, 1174–75 (2014). 
140. Schaffer & Herr, supra note 13, at 1629.
141. Rebecca A. Cochran, Federal Court Certification of Questions of State
Law to State Courts: A Theoretical and Empirical Study, 29 J. LEGIS. 157, 165 
(2003); see also Clay v. Sun Ins. Office Ltd., 363 U.S. 207, 226 (1960) (Black, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he Supreme Court of Florida has never promulgated any such 
rules, and evidently has never accepted such a certificate.”). 
142. 363 U.S. 207, 212 (1960).
143. See, e.g., Fiore v. White, 528 U.S. 23, 29 (1999) (certifying to the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court); Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 395–
97 (1988) (certifying to the Virginia Supreme Court); Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 
410, 416–17 (1982) (per curiam) (certifying to the Georgia Supreme Court); Bel-
lotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 150–53 (1976) (certifying to the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts). 
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abstention.144 Specifically, the Supreme Court noted that: “[cer-
tification] procedures do not entail the delays, expense, and pro-
cedural complexity that generally attend abstention deci-
sions.”145  
Following the Supreme Court’s lead of promoting certifica-
tion, the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act (UCQLA) 
proposed a unified standard for certification procedures in the 
late 1960s.146 The UCQLA proposed that the adopting state’s su-
preme court can certify a question from the federal court “if the 
answer may be determinative of an issue pending in litigation in 
the certifying court and there is no controlling appellate decision, 
constitutional provision, or statute of this State.”147 Because 
“[t]he Comments clarify that ‘a court of the United States’ in-
cludes all federal courts, . . . [t]he Uniform Act provides the 
broadest scope of certifying courts.”148 Through legislative or ju-
dicial rule making, nineteen states have effectively adopted the 
UCQLA by accepting certified questions from all federal 
courts.149 Specifically in the Eighth Circuit, three out of the 
seven states fall into this category of broad certification.150 Addi-
tionally, every state except North Carolina151 has some certifica-
tion procedures.152  
144. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997).
145. Id.
146. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 1 (amended 1995),
12 U.L.A. 86 (1967). 
147. UNIF. CERTIFICATION OF QUESTIONS OF LAW ACT § 3, 12 U.L.A. 74
(1995). 
148. Cochran, supra note 141, at 167.
149. Id. at app. A, at 223.
150. Id. (citing IOWA CODE ANN. § 684A.1 (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 480.065(3) (West 2014); N.D. R. APP. P. 47(a)). Missouri’s certification proce-
dure, MO. ANN. STAT. § 477.004 (West 1993), was held unconstitutional. Gran-
tham v. Mo. Dep’t of Corrections, No. 72576, 1990 WL 602159, at *1 (Mo. July
13, 1990) (en banc) (holding certification questions as outside the court’s juris-
diction).
151. A House Bill that would have permitted federal courts to certify ques-
tions to the North Carolina Supreme Court is currently pending in the state 
House of Representatives. H.B. 157, Gen. Assemb., 2017 Sess. (N.C. 2017), 
https://www.ncleg.net/Sessions/2017/Bills/House/PDF/H157v1.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8GTD-RFGG]. 
152. Klotz, supra note 139, at 1175 n.22.
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Despite such widescale acceptance of some certification pro-
cedures, many states remain reluctant to increase this proce-
dure.153 For example, seven of the ten largest states—California, 
Texas, Florida, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Georgia—
“chose the narrowest scope for certification.”154 That is, such 
states prohibit certified questions from particular courts, includ-
ing other state courts,155 federal district courts,156 and even some 
federal appellate courts.157  
Although “[t]he Supreme Court has never indicated the nec-
essary conditions before a court can resort to certification,”158 
several state supreme courts, specifically within the Eighth Cir-
cuit, have indicated when they will accept certified questions. 
For example, in 2003, the Arkansas Supreme Court declared 
that: “[c]ertification will only be necessary when our substantive 
law is unclear on an issue ‘which may be determinative of the 
cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it ap-
pears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent in 
the decisions of the Supreme Court.’”159 Likewise, the Minnesota 
Supreme Court has explained that certification is permissible “if 
there are . . . questions of law . . . which may be determinative of 
the cause then pending in the certifying court and as to which it 
153. See, e.g., Kidney v. Kolmar Labs., 808 F.2d 955, 957 (2d Cir. 1987) (rec-
ognizing that “issues of state law are not to be routinely certified to the highest 
courts of New York or Connecticut simply because a certification procedure is 
available. The procedure must not be a device for shifting the burdens of this 
Court to those whose burdens are at least as great”); Grantham, 1990 WL 
602159, at *1. 
154. Cochran, supra note 141, at 167 (defining “narrowest scope” as states
that “omit federal district courts”). 
155. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (West 2014) (permitting certification
questions only from federal courts of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court); GA. 
CODE ANN. § 15–2–9(a) (2012) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:72.1(A) (2011) 
(same); MISS. R. APP. P. 20(a) (same); PA. R. APP. P. 3341(a) (same); TEX. R. 
APP. P. 58.1 (same). 
156. CAL. APP. R. 8.548(a) (permitting certification questions only from fed-
eral appellate courts and state supreme courts); N.Y. CT. R. 500.27(a) (same); 
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 821.01 (West 2007) (same); see also supra note 155. 
157. See, e.g., ILL. SUP. CT. R. 20(a) (permitting certification questions only
from the U.S. Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit). See generally Cochran, 
supra note 141, app. A, at 223 (comparing states with broad, moderate, and 
narrow certification procedures). 
158. Fiat Motors of N. Am. Inc. v. Mayor of Wilmington, 619 F. Supp. 29, 33
(D. Del. 1985). 
159. Longview Prod. Co. v. Dubberly, 99 S.W.3d 427, 428 (Ark. 2003) (quot-
ing ARK. SUP. CT. R. 6–8(a)(2)). 
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appears to the certifying court there is no controlling precedent 
in the decisions of the supreme court.”160 Because of such stand-
ards, federal courts within the Eighth Circuit are generally 
aware of when their certified questions will be answered or re-
jected by the corresponding state supreme court.161  
Regarding federal court tendencies, some favor infrequent 
certification by holding that: “[t]he mere difficulty in ascertain-
ing local law provides an insufficient basis for certification.”162 
One federal court noted that “[c]ertification is not to be routinely 
invoked whenever a federal court is presented with an unsettled 
question of state law.”163 Other federal courts may choose Erie 
Guesses over certification for questions that “may never recur, 
and . . . lack broad general significance.”164 More specifically, 
within the Eighth Circuit, some federal courts rely on concrete 
factors to determine whether to certify, including (1) how unset-
tled the issue under consideration is by state courts, (2) how 
likely legal resources “would aid the court in coming to a conclu-
160. Wolner v. Mahaska Indus., Inc., 325 N.W.2d 39, 41 n.1 (Minn. 1982)
(quoting MINN. STAT. § 480.061, subd. 1 (1980)). 
161. See, e.g., Bornsen v. Pragotrade, 804 N.W.2d 55, 58 (N.D. 2011) (“Certi-
fied questions from foreign courts are appropriate when the legal issue ‘may be 
determinative of the proceeding’ pending in that court.” (quoting N.D. R. APP. 
P. 47(a))); Oyens Feed & Supply, Inc. v. Primebank, 808 N.W.2d 186, 188 (Iowa
2011) (noting the Court may “answer questions of Iowa law certified to us by a
federal court that concludes controlling precedent is lacking when the answer
may be determinative of the federal proceeding”); Amen v. Astrue, 822 N.W.2d
419, 423 (Neb. 2012) (explaining how the state legislature limited the court’s
certification “answers to questions of law which are certified”).
162. Duryee v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 6 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (S.D. Ohio
1995). For an explanation of the diverse tests used to determine whether to cer-
tify, see generally, John L. Watkins, Erie Denied: How Federal Courts Decide 
Insurance Coverage Cases Differently and What To Do About It, 21 CONN. INS. 
L.J. 455, 479–81 (2014).
163. Potter v. Synerlink Corp., No.08-CV-674-GKF-TLW, 2012 WL 2886015,
at *1 (N.D. Okla. July 13, 2012) (citations and internal quotation marks omit-
ted). 
164. Diginet, Inc. v. W. Union ATS, Inc., 958 F.2d 1388, 1395 (7th Cir. 1992);
cf. Barnes v. Atd. & Pac. Life Ins. Co. of Am., 514 F.2d 704, 706 (5th Cir. 1975) 
(choosing certification over an Erie Guess because “repetitive contract interpre-
tations” have a recurring “nature involving literally hundreds of contracts with 
many public policy factors affecting the welfare of local citizens”). See generally 
Rowson v. Kawaski Heavy Indus., 866 F. Supp. 1221, 1225 (N.D. Iowa 1994) 
(noting factors that federal courts should apply when deciding to certify ques-
tions). 
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sion on the legal issue,” (3) how familiar the court is with rele-
vant state law, (4) both the federal and state courts’ dockets, (5) 
“the frequency that the legal issue in question is likely to recur,” 
and (6) the current litigation’s age and “the possible prejudice to 
the litigants which may result from certification.”165 
Ultimately, proponents have called for certification over 
Erie Guesses because of its ability to limit the risk that federal 
courts will incorrectly interpret unsettled state law.166 Like ab-
stention, certification eliminates the possibility of inequitable 
administration of justice because state judges are allowed to de-
cide unsettled questions of state law.167 Additionally, “forum 
shopping” is limited because litigants seeking to bring a case in 
federal court for a more favorable landscape will virtually fall 
back into state court via certification.168  
In sum, precedent has supported Erie Guesses, abstention, 
and certification when federal courts are faced with ascertaining 
the unsettled laws of states. Scholars and courts emphasize the 
Erie Doctrine’s “twin aims” when advocating for a particular 
method.169 Notably, the Supreme Court has recommended and 
required certain procedures in narrow circumstances but has 
never come close to mandating a universal response to this Erie 
problem, even within specific procedures themselves.170 
II. AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF STATE “REACTIONS” TO
ERIE GUESSES WITHIN THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
In an effort to quantify the state courts’ responses to federal 
courts’ Erie Guesses, this Part focuses on a random 100 cases171 
165. Leiberkneckt v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 980 F. Supp. 300, 310
(N.D. Iowa 1997). 
166. Schaffer & Herr, supra note 13, at 1630.
167. Id.
168. Clark, supra note 20, at 1545.
169. See generally Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (emphasizing
avoiding both forum shopping and the inequitable administration of justice). 
170. Supra notes 133 and 134 and accompanying text.
171. For a list of the cases examined, see infra Appendix Tables 3–6. I se-
lected the cases based on citations to both Erie and its progeny that discussed 
how federal courts should proceed if the state court has not decided the issue. 
See, e.g., Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (noting that in the 
absence of a highest state court decision, a federal court should “apply what 
they find to be the state law after giving ‘proper regard’ to relevant rulings of 
other courts of the [s]tate” (citation omitted)). 
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within the Eighth Circuit that predicted issues of state law. Sec-
tion A provides a summary of the study’s methodology, limita-
tions, and interesting insights. The following subsections pro-
vide concrete details and examples from the study and explain 
several state supreme court holdings that highlight each states’ 
general reaction towards Erie Guesses. Section B discusses three 
states that validated at least 25% of the Erie Guesses involving 
their state law. Section C examines three states that over 75% 
of corresponding Erie Guesses were never referenced in a subse-
quent state court opinion. Section D reviews the one state—Mis-
souri—that rejected over 15% of corresponding Erie Guesses. 
A. METHODOLOGY, OVERALL INSIGHTS, AND LIMITATIONS
Ironically, a reader could describe the study itself as a pre-
diction of how state courts will handle federal courts’ predictions 
within the Eighth Circuit. The study’s goal was to (1) identify 
Erie Guesses made by the Eighth Circuit and its corresponding 
ten district courts172 and (2) determine how the corresponding 
states have judicially responded,173 if at all. As noted in the In-
troduction, the study was confined to the federal courts within 
the Eighth Circuit to obtain a dataset with a manageable size.174 
Because the Eighth Circuit has the second-largest number of 
states175 and second-largest number of district courts,176 the 
study included a wide range of Erie Guesses from different 
courts and state reactions to applicable Erie Guesses.  
Ultimately, the vast majority of Erie Guesses are left un-
touched by the corresponding state court.177 Indeed, seventy-two 
cases involved Erie Guesses that the state’s highest court has 
172. Finding caselaw that cited Erie or even Eighth Circuit cases that had
previously applied Erie Guesses was easy through electronic databases. Deter-
mining that such cases were actually applying Erie Guesses themselves proved, 
unsurprisingly, more difficult. 
173. Such responses were largely determined from traditional law school
lodestars (i.e., LexisNexis’s Shepard’s Citing Decisions and Westlaw’s KeyCite). 
174. See supra note 24.
175. The Eighth Circuit has seven states. The remaining circuits have the
number listed in parentheses: First (4), Second (3), Third (3), Fourth (5), Fifth 
(3), Sixth (4), Seventh (3), Ninth (9), Tenth (6), and Eleventh (3). See generally 
28 U.S.C. § 43 (2012) (establishing the circuits and their jurisdictions). 
176. The Eighth Circuit includes ten district courts. First (5), Second (6),
Third (6), Fourth (9), Fifth (9), Sixth (9), Seventh (7), Ninth (15), Tenth (8), and 
Eleventh (9). See generally id.  
177. See infra Appendix Tables 3–6.
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never cited.178 The next most frequent occurrence, however, was 
an affirmative response to Erie Guesses from state courts. 
Twenty-three cases fell into this category.179 The third and final 
occurrence, a state court rejecting an Erie Guess, happened only 
five times in the time period covered by the study.180  
The study also looked at possible trends among the states 
interacting with the Erie Guesses. For example, Appendix Ta-
bles 2 and 3 reveal that three states within the Eighth Circuit 
validated 25% or more of applicable Erie Guesses,181 three states 
did not respond to over 75% of Erie Guesses;182 and one state 
disagreed with at least 15% of Erie Guesses made about its 
law.183 The study also revealed tendencies of federal court’s Erie 
Guesses. Of the ten district courts within the Eighth Circuit, two 
made Erie Guesses that were validated at least 25% of the 
time.184 The Eighth Circuit is the only court that made Erie 
Guesses that were rejected.185 Noteworthy, however, is that 
state courts affirmed over 30% of the Eighth Circuit’s Erie 
Guesses.186  
Admittedly, the study could give a false sense of confidence 
regarding the study’s actual representativeness of other circuits 
and thus, Erie Guesses in general. Indeed, the study comprises 
fewer than 15% of states and fewer than 10% of federal courts.187 
Moreover, there is no indication that more states or district 
courts equates to more Erie Guesses.188 Consequently, there is 
178. See infra Appendix Tables 3–6.
179. See infra Appendix Table 4. This category also included Erie Guesses
validated by lower state courts (e.g., district and appellate state courts). 
180. See infra Appendix Table 5. This category also included one instance of
a state legislature rejecting an Erie Guess. 
181. See infra Appendix Table 1, left column.
182. See infra Appendix Table 1, middle column.
183. See infra Appendix Table 1, right column.
184. See infra Appendix Table 3 (D. Minn and S.D. Iowa).
185. See infra Appendix Table 5.
186. See infra Appendix Table 3.
187. Infra Appendix Tables 1–2.
188. Of course, there is the possibility that circuits with fewer states
and fewer district courts could have more Erie Guesses because of the familiar-
ity that each federal court may have with the corresponding state’s law. Unfor-
tunately, there is currently insufficient data that is generally required to prove 
such correlations. But see Furlough v. Cage (In re Technicool Sys.), 896 F.3d 
382, 386 n.9 (5th Cir. 2018) (articulating that the “the more money we come 
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no reason to consider this “snapshot” of the Eighth Circuit as 
representative of the nation at large.  
Perhaps more problematic, a reader may view the largest 
category—the “untouched” Erie Guesses—as merely representa-
tive of states that have not yet had the chance to consider the 
federal interpretations. Although there was no direct evidence 
that the state courts in this category are willfully ignoring the 
federal cases,189 over thirty-nine of the untouched Erie Guesses 
were decided at least fifteen years ago.190 Further, the Erie 
Guesses tended to interpret areas of unsettled law that state 
courts have discussed generally in later cases.191 Undeniably, 
the study does not purport to explain the reasoning behind such 
“untouched” Erie Guesses. But even considering such limita-
tions, several conclusions come to the fore within the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s courts that reveal Erie Guesses often reflect how the state 
court would rule had it considered the issue. 
B. VALIDATING STATES: MINNESOTA, NEBRASKA, AND
ARKANSAS
Sometimes, Erie Guesses work well. That is, federal courts 
predict what the state’s highest court would rule and the state 
courts respond affirmatively. Within the Eighth Circuit, Minne-
sota, Nebraska, and Arkansas validated at least 25% of the Erie 
Guesses that predicted their state law.192 Notably, Minnesota 
was most likely to affirm Erie Guesses with 50% validated out of 
across, the more problems we see” without referencing a single statistic (quot-
ing NOTORIOUS B.I.G., Mo Money Mo Problems, on LIFE AFTER DEATH (Bad 
Boy/Arista 1997))). 
189. Perhaps the best evidence to support this assertion would be that these
states’ supreme courts have certiorari-like discretionary review procedures and 
are denying review in cases involving the issues decided by the federal courts. 
Unfortunately, denials of review rarely discuss the reasoning behind the court, 
let alone what issues caused the court to decline certiorari. Darr v. Burford, 339 
U.S. 200, 226 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (“The denial means that this 
Court has refused to take the case. It means nothing else.”). See generally Peter 
Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227 (1979) (dis-
cussing the history of denials of certiorari and dissents from certiorari denials). 
190. Infra Appendix Tables 3–6.
191. See, e.g., McGuire v. Davidson Mfg. Corp., 398 F.3d 1005, 1008–09 (8th
Cir. 2005) (applying an Erie Guess to predict how the Iowa Supreme Court 
would define res ipsa loquitur). 
192. See infra Appendix Table 1, left column.
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fourteen Erie Guesses.193 Though Nebraska and Arkansas were 
not as likely to affirm as Minnesota, the limited opportunities 
(eight Erie Guesses involving Nebraska state law and sixteen in-
volving Arkansas state law) made those affirmations impact-
ful.194 
Of the twenty-three cases that were affirmed, sixteen came 
from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals; two from the District 
Court of Minnesota; two from the Northern District of Iowa; one 
from the Southern District of Iowa; and one from the District 
Court of Nebraska.195 The distinction between the federal court 
that states tend to affirm is important when discussing the use-
fulness of certification procedures from particular courts.196 
1. Minnesota
One such affirmation occurred when the Minnesota Su-
preme Court upheld the federal district court’s prediction re-
garding the elements of tortious interference/publication of pri-
vate fact.197 In 1998, the Minnesota Supreme Court first 
recognized this claim as a viable cause of action in Lake v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc.198 Then, in 1999, the federal district court of 
Minnesota, in C.L.D. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,199 parsed out the 
elements of tortious interference of private fact because the Min-
nesota Supreme Court did not do so completely in Lake.200 Spe-
cifically, the federal court explained that “publicity means that 
the matter is made public, by communicating it to the public at 
large, or to so many persons that the matter must be regarded 
193. See infra Appendix Table 1, left column.
194. See infra Appendix Table 1, left column.
195. See infra Appendix Table 3.
196. See infra Part III.
197. Bodah v. Lakeville Motor Express Inc., 663 N.W.2d 550, 553 (Minn.
2003). 
198. 582 N.W.2d 231, 236 (Minn. 1998).
199. 79 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1087–88 (D. Minn. 1999).
200. See Bodah, 663 N.W.2d at 553 (explaining that “[t]he Lake court did not
define ‘publicity’”); see also C.L.D., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 (“[R]elevant Minne-
sota cases offer no guidance regarding what facts an invasion of privacy tort 
claimant must allege in order to satisfy the burden of showing that ‘publicity’ or 
‘publication’ of private information has occurred . . . . Lake thus conferred upon 
other courts the task of defining the contours of these newly recognized causes 
of action.”). 
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as substantially certain to become one of public knowledge.”201 
Under this definition, “it is not an invasion of the right of pri-
vacy . . . to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiff’s private 
life to a single person or even to a small group of persons.”202 
In 2003, the Minnesota Supreme Court responded to the fed-
eral courts’ interpretation of “publicity.”203 After considering al-
ternative definitions that the federal court did not predict, the 
Minnesota Supreme Court “adopt[ed] the Restatement defini-
tion of ‘publicity.’”204 The Court therefore effectively accepted the 
federal court’s predictive definition, and even relied on C.L.D. in 
applying the definition.205 In sum, the Minnesota Supreme Court 
agreed with the federal court’s Erie Guess.206 Thus, the available 
certification procedure207 would not have changed the cases’ out-
come.208 
2. Arkansas
Similarly, in Chavers v. General Motors Corp.,209 the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court confirmed a standard of proximate causation 
in tort actions, which the Eighth Circuit predicted in Jackson v. 
Anchor Packing Co.210 In Jackson, “[t]en former employees of the 
Mohawk Tire and Rubber Company plant in West Helena, Ar-
kansas . . . filed suit against numerous manufacturers of asbes-
tos-containing products.”211 The district court adopted the “fre-
quency, regularity, and proximity” test, and granted the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment because the plaintiffs 
had failed to “produce sufficient evidence that exposure to the 
201. C.L.D., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1083 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 652D, cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1979)). 
202. Id.
203. Bodah, 663 N.W.2d at 556–58.
204. Id. at 557.
205. Id. at 557–58 (concluding “that respondents’ claim that LME dissemi-
nated 204 employees’ social security numbers to 16 terminal managers in six 
states does not constitute publication to the public or to so large a number of 
persons that the matter must be regarded as substantially certain to become 
public” (citing C.L.D., 79 F. Supp. 2d at 1084)). 
206. Id.
207. MINN. STAT. § 480.065, subd. 3 (2012).
208. Bodah, 663 N.W.2d at 555.
209. 79 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Ark. 2002).
210. 994 F.2d 1295, 1303 (8th Cir. 1993).
211. Id. at 1298.
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defendants’ products had proximately caused the plaintiffs’ inju-
ries.”212  
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit grappled with the district 
court’s proximate causation standard that the plaintiffs argued 
was “more stringent than Arkansas law require[d].”213 Im-
portantly, the Arkansas Supreme Court had not yet addressed 
the proper standard for proximate causation in tort cases.214 
Consequently, the Eighth Circuit had “to predict how the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court would resolve the issue if confronted with 
it.”215 In making its prediction, the Eighth Circuit noted how the 
majority of courts confronted with this same issue adopted the 
“frequency, regularity, and proximity” test.216 Next, the Eighth 
Circuit relied on analogous Arkansas caselaw to reject the plain-
tiffs’ argument that Arkansas had adopted alternative liability 
and, thereby, abrogated “the traditional requirement of proxi-
mate cause in all tort cases.”217 Hence, the Eighth Circuit’s Erie 
Guess was that the Arkansas Supreme Court would still require 
proximate cause and weigh this element via the “frequency, reg-
ularity, and proximity” test.218 
Nine years after Jackson, the Arkansas Supreme Court val-
idated the Eighth Circuit’s Erie Guess. In Chavers v. General 
Motors Corp., the Arkansas Supreme Court faced the same issue 
as the Eighth Circuit in Jackson.219 That is, whether Arkansas 
tort law requires proximate causation for a plaintiff to prevail.220 
The Court upheld the requirement and adopted the “frequency, 
regularity, and proximity” test.221 In its discussion, the Court 
noted how the Eighth Circuit adopted this test in Jackson and 
acknowledged the accuracy of the Eighth Circuit’s prediction.222 
212. Id. at 1299.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 1301.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1302–03 (citing Woodward v. Blythe, 439 S.W.2d 919, 920 (Ark.
1969)). 
218. Id. at 1303–04.
219. 79 S.W.3d 361, 369 (Ark. 2002).
220. Id. at 367.
221. Id. at 368 (“We conclude that the ‘frequency, regularity, and proximity’
test is the correct test to apply in this case, and we adopt it.” (citation omitted)). 
222. Id. at 368 (“[T]he Eighth Circuit . . . , in reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, affirmed the district court and held that if the issue was presented 
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Additionally, the Court used Jackson to analogize the facts on 
hand223 and articulate why the plaintiff failed to satisfy the 
standard.224 
Even more explicitly, the Arkansas Supreme Court, in 
Burkett v. PPG Industries, Inc.,225 commended the Eighth Cir-
cuit in its prediction of a novel principle of law in Kifer v. Liberty 
Mutual Insurance Co.226 In Kifer, “an injured employee sued the 
carrier of his employer’s workers’ compensation insurance claim-
ing that it had independent liability to him for a workplace in-
jury caused by its failure to inspect the premises and warn him 
of danger.”227 The Eighth Circuit hypothesized that the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court would hold that Arkansas’ workers’ compen-
sation act precludes such liability.228 Two years later, in Burkett, 
the Arkansas Supreme Court firmly validated this prediction by 
stating: “the Eighth Circuit has considered the matter and has 
predicted, with great accuracy as it turns out, our holding.”229 
3. Nebraska
The Nebraska Supreme Court has also validated Erie
Guesses from the Eighth Circuit230 and the District Court of Ne-
braska. Regarding the latter, in Bryan Memorial Hospital v. Al-
lied Property & Casualty Insurance Co.,231 the district court pre-
dicted that the Nebraska Supreme Court would recognize an 
independent cause of action for a hospital against an insurance 
company that separately paid a party who was injured by a tort-
feasor.232 In other words, the court assumed that the Nebraska 
Supreme Court would allow hospitals that treated those injured 
by tortfeasors, the ability to collect money given to the injured 
to us, the Arkansas Supreme Court would adopt the ‘frequency, regularity, and 
proximity’ test in determining whether proximate cause had been proven in 
toxic-tort cases.” (citation omitted)). 
223. Id. at 370.
224. Id.
225. 740 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Ark. 1987).
226. 777 F.2d 1325, 1329 (8th Cir. 1985).
227. Burkett, 740 S.W.2d at 624–25 (citing Kifer, 777 F.2d at 1326).
228. Kifer, 777 F.2d at 1332 (citing ARK. CODE. ANN. § 81–1340 (Repl. 1976)).
229. Burkett, 740 S.W.2d at 624.
230. Ames v. Hehner, 435 N.W.2d 869, 874 (Neb. 1989) (citing Gillette Dairy,
Inc. v. Mallard Mfg. Corp., 707 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1983)). 
231. 163 F. Supp. 2d 1059, 1066 (D. Neb. 2001).
232. Id. at 1065–66.
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party.233 Specifically, the district court noted that the hospital 
needs to prove only that “it had a perfected hospital lien under 
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 52-401, the amount of that lien, and 
that . . .[the insurer] impaired that lien.”234 
Two years after Bryan Memorial Hospital, the Nebraska Su-
preme Court affirmed the district court’s Erie Guess in Alegent 
Health v. American Family Insurance.235 In Alegent Health, the 
plaintiff hospital’s patient was injured in an automobile accident 
by a tortfeasor.236 However, when the tortfeasor’s insurer, the 
defendant, settled with the patient, they failed to put the hospi-
tal’s name on the settlement check.237 The Nebraska Supreme 
Court relied on the federal district court’s holding in Bryan Me-
morial Hospital, and adopted the standard predicted.238 There-
fore, Alegent Health represents a highest state court’s affirma-
tion of a federal district court, as opposed to an affirmation of the 
Eighth Circuit itself. 
C. ACQUIESCENT STATES: NORTH DAKOTA, SOUTH DAKOTA, AND
IOWA
Much more common than affirming or dissenting patterns 
in the study, states generally tended to neither agree nor disa-
gree with a federal court’s interpretation of a novel state 
claim.239 Within the Eighth Circuit, Iowa, North Dakota, and 
South Dakota all revealed strong tendencies to leave Erie 
Guesses “untouched.”240 Of the seventy-two cases left “un-
touched,” twelve came from South Dakota’s fifteen applicable 
Erie Guesses, nine from North Dakota’s ten, and fourteen from 
Iowa’s eighteen.241 As previously noted, all three of these states 
left untouched over 75% of applicable Erie Guesses.242  
233. Id. at 1066–67.
234. Id. at 1066.
235. 656 N.W.2d 906, 911 (Neb. 2003).
236. Id. at 907–08.
237. Id. at 907.
238. Id. at 911 (“[I]n such a case, the hospital needs to prove only that ‘it had
a perfected hospital lien under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 52-401, the amount of that lien, 
and that [the insurer] impaired that lien.’” (quoting Bryan Mem’l Hosp., 163 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1066)). 
239. See infra Appendix Figure 1.
240. See infra Appendix Table 2.
241. See infra Appendix Table 2.
242. See supra note 182 and accompanying text.
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1. South Dakota
For example, in the 1995 case Novak v. Navistar Interna-
tional Transportation Corp.,243 the Eighth Circuit predicted how 
the South Dakota Supreme Court244 would rule regarding the 
proper jury instruction for the assumption of risk in a strict prod-
ucts-liability trial.245 In Novak, the plaintiff brought a products 
liability action against the defendant company that manufac-
tured a tractor that rolled onto the plaintiff while in neutral.246 
The lower court ruled in the defendant’s favor, and the plaintiff 
appealed, arguing that the court gave an incorrect jury instruc-
tion regarding assumption of risk.247 Ultimately, the Eighth Cir-
cuit relied on a provision within the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts after it noted how the Supreme Court had relied on the 
same provision in previous cases.248 Despite Novak involving a 
farming accident in a mainly agricultural state,249 the South Da-
kota Supreme Court has not yet addressed the federal court’s 
prediction.250  
Likewise, in the 2002 case of Orion Financial Corp. v. Amer-
ican Foods Group, Inc.,251 the Eighth Circuit made an Erie 
Guess252 when it predicted how the South Dakota Supreme 
243. 46 F.3d 844 (8th Cir. 1995).
244. See id. at 847 (“If state law is unsettled, it is our duty to apply the rule
we believe the South Dakota Supreme Court would follow.” (citations omitted)). 
245. Id. at 849 (“[W]e conclude that the South Dakota Supreme Court would
accept [the plaintiff’s argument]”). 
246. Id. at 846–47.
247. Id. at 848–49.
248. Id. at 849 (citing Berg v. Sukup Mfg. Co., 355 N.W.2d 833 (S.D. 1984);
Smith v. Smith, 278 N.W.2d 155, 161 (S.D. 1979); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS § 402A (AM. LAW INST 1965). 
249. See generally CENSUS OF AGRIC., STATE PROFILE: SOUTH DAKOTA 
(2012), https://www.nass.usda.gov/Publications/AgCensus/2012/Online_ 
Resources/County_Profiles/South_Dakota/cp99046.pdf [https://perma.cc/87S2-
6TB8] (noting that over ten billion dollars of market value in agricultural prod-
ucts sold in South Dakota in 2012). 
250. But see Wangsness v. Builders Cashway, Inc., 779 N.W.2d 136, 144
(N.D. 2010) (distinguishing Novak, 46 F.3d 844). 
251. 281 F.3d 733 (8th Cir. 2002).
252. Id. at 737 (“As a federal court, our role in diversity cases is to interpret
state law, not to fashion it. Thus, if the state law is unsettled, it is our duty to 
apply the rule it believes the South Dakota Supreme Court would follow.” (citing 
Novak, 46 F.3d at 847)). 
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Court would rule regarding the definition of “prejudgment inter-
est” in an agreement between two parties.253 After nearly seven-
teen years, the South Dakota Supreme Court has yet to cite the 
Eighth Circuit’s interpretation and thus Orion remains good 
law. Consequently, the South Dakota state courts’ reluctance to 
disagree with the Eighth Circuit illustrates the idea that when 
states do not disagree, they essentially agree by acquiescence. 
2. North Dakota
Another state that showed a strong tendency to leave Erie
Guesses untouched is North Dakota.254 In nine out of ten Erie 
Guesses involving North Dakota law, no North Dakota state 
court has responded.255 For example, in Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, 
Inc., the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court prediction that 
the North Dakota Supreme Court would adopt the learned inter-
mediary doctrine.256 This doctrine applies to tort cases involving 
a manufacturer and a supplier who was informed of the risks 
involved with the goods being supplied.257 Legally, the supplier 
has a duty to warn of said risks and the consumer is barred from 
bringing actions against the manufacturer.258 For example, in 
Ehlis, the plaintiff college student began to hallucinate after tak-
ing the prescribed dosage of Adderall and killed his infant 
daughter.259 The plaintiff sued both the psychiatrist and phar-
maceutical manufacturer for failing to warn the student of the 
associated risks, which include psychosis.260 As a defense, the 
manufacturer argued that the learned intermediary principle 
barred any claims other than those against the supplier psychi-
atrist himself.261 The Eighth Circuit agreed and thus, dismissed 
253. Id. at 744 (establishing that “the test of awarding interest is not
whether liability was clear, but whether (assuming liability) the damages were 
reasonably ascertainable by reference to prevailing markets.” (quoting City of 
Sioux Falls v. Kelley, 513 N.W.2d 97, 112 (S.D. 1994))).  
254. See infra Appendix Table 3.
255. See infra Appendix Table 3.
256. 367 F.3d 1013, 1017 (8th Cir. 2004).
257. Id. at 1016–17.
258. Id. at 1016.
259. Id. at 1015.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1017.
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all claims against the manufacturer.262 Although many jurisdic-
tions have adopted the learned intermediary principle, 263 the 
North Dakota state courts have yet to respond to the Eighth Cir-
cuit’s prediction.  
3. Iowa
The third state that left untouched over 75% of applicable
Erie Guesses was Iowa.264 For example, in McGuire v. Davidson 
Manufacturing Corp., the Eighth Circuit upheld the Northern 
District of Iowa’s holding based on the Eighth Circuit’s predic-
tion of how the Iowa Supreme Court would rule on a question 
regarding res ipsa loquitur.265 In McGuire, the plaintiff fell off a 
six-foot stepladder manufactured by the defendants and suffered 
severe injuries to his head.266 Among other claims, the plaintiff 
relied on a theory of res ipsa loquitur.267 At the district court, a 
jury awarded the plaintiff $311,838.57 in damages.268 The de-
fendants appealed, arguing that “a plaintiff must satisfy the ‘vol-
untary action rule’269 to prevail on a res ipsa loquitur, or general 
negligence, claim under Iowa law.”270 On appeal, the Eighth Cir-
cuit noted that “[t]he Iowa Supreme Court has not expressly ad-
dressed the issue of whether a plaintiff employing res ipsa loqui-
tur must still prove he or she was not at fault under Iowa’s 
comparative fault system.”271 Such absence, however, did not 
prevent the Eighth Circuit from deciding the unsettled law. Ap-
plying an Erie Guess, the Eighth Circuit predicted that the Iowa 
Supreme Court “like many other high courts, will find will find 
262. Id. at 1019.
263. Id. at 1016–17. (“The learned intermediary doctrine has been adopted
in most jurisdictions . . . .” (quoting Desmarais v. Dow Corning Corp., 712 F. 
Supp. 13, 17 (D. Conn. 1989))). 
264. See infra Appendix Table 1.
265. 398 F.3d 1005, 1008–09 (8th Cir. 2005).
266. Id. at 1006.
267. Id. See generally Res Ipsa Loquitor, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed.
2019) (Latin for “the thing speaks for itself”) (“The doctrine providing that, in 
some circumstances, the mere fact of an accident’s occurrence raises an infer-
ence of negligence that establishes a prima facie case . . . .”). 
268. McGuire, 398 F.3d at 1007. Specifically, the jury found that both the
defendant and plaintiff were 50% responsible for the accident. Id. 
269. Id. at 1007 (explaining that this rule requires the plaintiff to prove “by
a preponderance of the evidence that his actions did not cause the accident”). 
270. Id.
271. Id. at 1008.
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that in a comparative negligence system, plaintiffs using res ipsa 
loquitur need not disprove their own fault to prevail.”272 This 
holding was in-line with “[t]he majority of states that have con-
sidered the question.”273  
Since McGuire, the Iowa Supreme Court has ruled on the 
res ipsa loquitur doctrine at least three different times.274 In 
spite of such relevant rulings, neither the Iowa Supreme Court, 
nor any state intermediate appellate court has addressed 
McGuire’s reasoning. As noted, this avenue was the most fre-
quent of state courts within the Eighth Circuit, as almost three 
quarters of the Erie Guesses studied were left untouched.275 
D. DISSENTING STATE: MISSOURI
In the rare times that Erie Guesses are inaccurate, the state
courts explicitly disagreed with the federal court’s prediction. 
Within the Eighth Circuit, Missouri is the only state that explic-
itly rejected over 15% of its nineteen applicable Erie Guesses.276 
All of Missouri’s rejections came from the Eighth Circuit and in-
volved insurance law.277 
First, in Farmland Industries v. Republic Insurance Co.,278 
the Missouri Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s Erie 
Guess in the 1988 case of Continental Insurance Co. v. North-
eastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co. (NEPACCO).279 In 
NEPACCO, the Eighth Circuit held that damages should be de-
fined “in the insurance context.”280 Further, the NEPACCO court 
272. Id. at 1009; see also id. at 1008 (“Iowa adopted a comparative fault sys-
tem in 1984.”). 
273. Id. at 1008 (citing Cox v. May Dep’t Store Co., 903 P.2d 1119, 1124 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 1995); Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Gordon, 619 P.2d 66, 70 (Colo. 
1980); Giles v. City of New Haven, 636 A.2d 1335, 1341–42 (Conn. 1994); Dar-
rough v. Glendale Heights Comm. Hosp., 600 N.E.2d 1248, 1253 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1992); Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 712 P.2d 1351, 1359 (N.M. 1985); Turtenwald v. 
Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 201 N.W.2d 1, 4–5 (Wis. 1972)). 
274. Banks v. Beckwith, 762 N.W.2d 149, 150 (Iowa 2009); Conner v.
Menard, Inc., 705 N.W.2d 318, 320 (Iowa 2005); Clinkscales v. Nelson Sec., Inc., 
697 N.W.2d 836, 847 (Iowa 2005). 
275. See infra Appendix Figure 1.
276. See infra Appendix Table 1, right column.
277. See infra Appendix Table 3.
278. 941 S.W.2d 505, 510 (Mo. 1997).
279. 842 F.2d 977, 985 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821
(1988). 
280. Id. at 985–86.
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held that the “plain meaning of ‘damages’ . . . refers to legal dam-
ages and does not include equitable monetary relief.”281 Ulti-
mately, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that, in NEPACCO, 
the Eighth Circuit “misconstrue[d] and circumvent[ed] Missouri 
law.”282 Specifically, the Court explained that “[t]he cases upon 
which the [federal] court relie[d] for the proposition that ‘dam-
ages’ distinguishes between claims at law and claims at equity 
are not persuasive.”283 
Similarly, in Rodriguez v. General Accident Insurance Co., 
the Missouri Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s Erie 
Guess from Weber v. American Family Mutual Insurance Co.,284 
as inconsistent with Missouri law.285 In Weber, the Eighth Cir-
cuit held that “an insured . . . would never reach the limits of li-
ability set forth in [an underinsured motorist coverage] unless 
the insured was dealing with an uninsured motorist . . . .”286 
However, similar to its reasoning in Farmland Industries, the 
Missouri Supreme Court rejected the Eighth Circuit’s interpre-
tation “as inconsistent with state law.”287 Critically, the Su-
preme Court noted that: “Weber is an example of a court creating 
an ambiguity in order to distort the language of an unambiguous 
policy. Weber is not binding on this Court. Indeed, having con-
sidered the issue, we reject the holding in Weber as inconsistent 
with Missouri law.”288 Thus, both Farmland Industries and Ro-
driguez reveal that state courts are not unwilling to contradict 
Erie Guesses when they believe the federal courts have inaccu-
rately predicted state law. However, the study revealed that 
such rejections are relatively rare in that only five Erie Guesses 
involved contradicting state court opinions.289 Erie Guesses, 
therefore, are generally accepted or ignored by state courts. 
281. Id. at 985.
282. Farmland Indus., 941 S.W.2d at 510.
283. Id.
284. 868 F.2d 286 (8th Cir. 1989).
285. 808 S.W.2d 379, 383 (Mo. 1991).
286. Weber, 868 F.2d at 288.
287. Rodriguez, 808 S.W.2d at 383.
288. Id.
289. See infra Appendix Figure 1.
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III. ERIE GUESSES ACT AS NECESSARY LIGHTHOUSES
THAT COULD SHINE BRIGHTER WHEN GUIDING
FEDERAL COURTS IN UNCHARTED WATERS
This Part uses the interworking of caselaw, practicality con-
cerns, and congressional legislation to support a more explicit 
approach that Eighth Circuit courts should take when asked to 
predict state law. Section A explains why the Erie Doctrine’s 
caselaw and practicality concerns support the continued use of 
Erie Guesses within the Eighth Circuit. Section B then relies on 
the Judicial Improvements Act of 1990290 as Congress’s implicit 
affirmation of Erie Guesses. Section C describes the unintended 
consequences of alternatives such as abstention and certifica-
tion, which are exemplified through Part II’s study. Section D 
offers a purported quasi-middle ground through a more explicit 
approach that both litigants and judges may rely on when navi-
gating unchartered waters of state law. 
A. PRECEDENT AND PRACTICALITY CONCERNS SUPPORT
CONTINUING ERIE GUESSES
As noted above, Erie Guesses are how federal courts have 
interpreted the Erie Doctrine to apply to unclear state law issues 
for eighty years.291 These decisions address a main critique of 
Erie Guesses: federal predictions are unfounded in precedent 
and undermine the Erie Doctrine’s purposes of avoiding the in-
equitable administration of justice associated with inconsistent 
holdings.292 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has confronted this 
argument by advising lower courts to provide Erie Guesses in 
situations where the state court is silent.293 Erie Guesses there-
fore are not a novel legal concept and the Supreme Court has 
arguably upheld their use by federal courts. 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has given specific direc-
tions to federal courts when state courts are silent on an issue. 
For example, in Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, the Supreme 
290. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2012).
291. See supra Part II.B. But see Clark, supra note 20, at 1517 (contending
that Supreme Court opinions merely “contain dicta suggesting that federal 
courts should employ a predictive approach”). 
292. See generally Chang, supra note 13, at 266–67 (noting that the Erie
Guess raises constitutional problems because of the inequitable administration 
of justice associated with inconsistent holdings by different courts and that Erie 
did not warrant such predictions). 
293. See supra Part II.B.
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Court explained that if the highest state court has not addressed 
the question of state law at issue, a federal court sitting in diver-
sity jurisdiction should “apply what they find to be the state law 
after giving ‘proper regard’ to relevant rulings of other courts of 
the [s]tate.”294 Moreover, the Supreme Court has directed federal 
courts to “ascertain from all the available data what the state 
law is.”295 Such “available data” includes the highest state 
court’s recent decisions on similar issues and other jurisdictions’ 
precedents.296  
Such guidance not only helps federal courts when ascertain-
ing the unsettled laws of states, but also supports the Erie Doc-
trine’s “twin aims.”297 Concerns about practicality, as revealed 
through this Note’s study, buttress this argument. First, the Su-
preme Court has noted that Erie was intended to deter the ineq-
uitable administration of justice.298 The study reveals that such 
“inequitable administration of the laws” arguably only occurred 
in 5% of the cases applying Erie Guesses.299 As noted in the 
study’s limitations, the large “untouched” Erie Guesses may 
merely represent states that have not yet had the chance to re-
verse the federal interpretations.300 Still, over thirty-nine of the 
untouched Erie Guesses were decided at least fifteen years ago301 
and the study’s Erie Guesses tended to interpret areas of unset-
tled law that state courts have generally discussed in later 
cases.302 Consequently, the “inequitable administration of the 
laws” resulting from identical litigants receiving different re-
sults dependent on the jurisdiction has not resulted in a vast 
majority of Erie Guesses that the study analyzed. Second, the 
Supreme Court has noted that Erie was intended to deter forum 
shopping.303 The study revealed that 95% of Erie Guesses involve 
294. 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
295. West v. AT&T Co., 311 U.S. 223, 236–37 (1940).
296. Id.
297. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (emphasizing avoiding both
forum shopping and the inequitable administration of justice). 
298. Id.
299. See infra Appendix Figure 1.
300. See supra Part III.A.
301. See infra Appendix Tables 3–6.
302. McGuire v. Davidson Mfg. Corp., 398 F.3d 1005, 1008–09 (8th Cir.
2005) (applying an Erie Guess to predict how the Iowa Supreme Court would 
define res ipsa loquitur). 
303. Hanna, 308 U.S. at 468.
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issues that the state court has not explicitly contradicted.304 
Based on this finding, one is hard-pressed to claim litigants ei-
ther picked federal courts for a more favorable outcome or would 
have fared better had state judges decided their case. 
Also, the Supreme Court has noted that the Erie Doctrine’s 
essence is that federal judges can equally interpret state law as 
state judges. Specifically, in Salve Regina College v. Russell, the 
Supreme Court noted that: “The very essence of the Erie doc-
trine is that the bases of state law are presumed to be communi-
cable by the parties to a federal judge no less than to a state 
judge.”305 The Court continued: “[a]lmost 35 years ago, Professor 
[Philip] Kurland stated: ‘Certainly, if the law is not a brooding 
omnipresence in the sky over the United States, neither is it a 
brooding omnipresence in the sky of Vermont, or New York or 
California.’”306  
The Eighth Circuit has also followed this precedent and 
these practicality concerns, noting that if the issue is a matter of 
first impression for the state court, the federal court has the “re-
sponsibility to predict, as best [it] can, how that [state’s highest] 
court would decide the issue.”307 Such guidance, coupled with the 
Supreme Court’s rationale in Russell, Bosch, and West and the 
practicality concerns supported by the study, reveal that Erie 
Guesses and the more explicit approach proposed in Section D 
are well-founded in the Erie Doctrine’s progeny and are effective 
methods of accomplishing the Erie Doctrine’s goals.  
B.  CONGRESSIONAL INSIGHT: SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION: 28
U.S.C. § 1367 AND DISCRETIONARY POWERS
In addition to federal courts interpreting the Erie Doctrine 
and applying Erie Guesses, Congress itself has arguably vali-
dated Erie Guesses through 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c), the Judicial Im-
provements Act of 1990. This Act defines the scope of federal 
supplemental jurisdiction and implies that federal courts have 
304. See infra Appendix Figure 1.
305. 499 U.S. 225, 238 (1991).
306. Id. at 238–39 (citing Philip B. Kurland, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, the
Supreme Court and the Erie doctrine in Diversity Cases, 67 YALE L.J. 187, 217 
(1957)). 
307. Brandenburg v. Allstate Ins., 23 F.3d 1438, 1440 (8th Cir. 1994).
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the power to provide Erie Guesses when the state courts are si-
lent.308 Because Congress has the constitutional power to deter-
mine what claims federal courts may hear,309 28 U.S.C. § 1367 
arguably vests federal courts with the power to make Erie 
Guesses. 
In the Judiciary Act of 1789 itself, there remains the key 
provision that “the laws of the several states . . . shall be re-
garded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts 
of the United States” except “where the constitution, treaties or 
statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or pro-
vide.”310 Also, in Erie, the Supreme Court noted that “[s]upervi-
sion over either the legislative or the judicial action of the states 
is in no case permissible except as to matters by the constitution 
specifically authorized or delegated to the United States.”311 
These exceptions provide Congress the opportunity to authorize 
federal courts to hear state claims that are otherwise binding. 
In 1990, Congress exercised this power through the Judicial 
Improvements Act.312 This Act was passed in response to Finley 
v. United States,313 a Supreme Court case that limited federal
courts’ ability to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.314 The Act
states that: “[e]xcept as provided in [subsequent subsec-
308. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2012) (“The district courts shall have supple-
mental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the 
action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or 
controversy . . . .”). 
309. See supra Part II.A.
310. The Rules of Decision Act, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2012)). 
311. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78–79 (1938) (emphasis added)
(quoting Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401 (1893) (Field, 
J., dissenting)).  
312. Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–650, § 310(a), 104
Stat. 5089, 5113 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2012)). 
313. 490 U.S. 545 (1989) (upholding the Ninth Circuit’s denial of supple-
mental jurisdiction to ancillary state law tort claims). See generally Rachel El-
len Hinkle, The Revision of 28 U.S.C. 1367(c) and the Debate over the District 
Court’s Discretion to Decline Supplemental Jurisdiction, 69 TENN. L. REV. 111, 
118–19 (2001) (explaining Finley and its implications on federal courts’ supple-
mental jurisdiction powers).  
314. H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 28 (1990) (“Indeed, the Supreme Court has
virtually invited Congress to codify supplemental jurisdiction by commenting in 
Finley, ‘[w]hat ever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction . . . can of course 
be changed by Congress.’”). 
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tions] . . . the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdic-
tion over all other claims that are so related to claims in the ac-
tion within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the 
same case or controversy under Article III . . . .”315 More im-
portantly, § 1367(c)(1) states that: “[t]he district courts may 
decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a 
claim . . . if . . . the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State 
law.”316 The inference317 follows that if Congress carved out an 
exception for when federal courts may choose not to decide novel 
state or complex issues, clearly Congress concurred—or at the 
very least acquiesced—with what has become known as the Erie 
Guess.318 Thus, the Erie Guess arguably became an exception to 
both the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Erie Doctrine because 
Congress recognized the ability of federal courts to decide such 
claims when the state is silent. If Congress has given federal 
courts this right, the Eighth Circuit may adopt a more explicit 
approach that courts should take when asked to predict state 
law.  
315. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).
316. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(1). Interestingly, some scholars have advocated that
Congress, under its Art. IV, § 1 powers, should “enact a federal statute imposing 
on state supreme courts an obligation to decide unclear issues of state law cer-
tified by federal courts, trial and appellate, for resolution.” L. Lynn Hogue, Law 
in a Parallel Universe: Erie’s Betrayal, Diversity Jurisdiction, Georgia Conflict 
of Law Questions in Contract Cases in the Eleventh Circuit, and Certification 
Reform, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 531, 540–41 (1995). Such a proposal has not 
seemed to garner much traction. See generally Jonathan Remy Nash, Examin-
ing the Power of Federal Courts to Certify  Questions of Law, 88 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1672, 1680 n.18 (2003) (proposing instead a state specialized tribunal to 
review Erie Guesses).  
317. If I tell my daughter, Hazel, that she can choose not to eat cookies, then
she arguably has the choice to eat cookies. 
318. See generally Blue Dane Simmental Corp. v. Am. Simmental Ass’n, 952
F. Supp. 1399, 1411 (D. Neb. 1997) (noting that § 1367(c)’s discretionary power
“does not mean . . . that a federal trial court can simply refuse to hear a state
law claim . . . unless the criteria set forth in § 1367(c) exist in the case before
it”); Clark, supra note 20, at 1533–35 (explaining how Congress, via the Judicial
Improvement Act, effectively permitted federal courts to make Erie Guesses).
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C.  ALTERNATIVE METHODS DO NOT EFFECTIVELY ADDRESS THE
UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR PROPOSALS
As discussed above, several alternatives have garnered at-
traction with opponents of Erie Guesses.319 Certification proce-
dures and abstention are appealing to judges and legal scholars 
seeking to limit the power of federal courts.320 However, as dis-
cussed below, these methods fall short in addressing the Erie 
Doctrine’s aims and are less effective than Erie Guesses. 
1. Certification
Certification proponents emphasize the Supreme Court’s
use of this procedure,321 and how it avoids the possibility of the 
inequitable administration of justice because federal courts must 
ask state courts how they would decide the unsettled issue.322 
Additionally, “forum shopping” is limited because federal liti-
gants essentially fall back into state court via certification.323 
Despite these benefits, advocates underestimate the unin-
tended consequences such procedures entail. For example, certi-
fication can actually lead to forum shopping in certain situa-
tions.324 Indeed, certification may incentivize a plaintiff to 
circumvent a state’s trial and intermediary appellate courts by 
simply filing in federal court only to immediately ask for certifi-
cation.325 Likewise, “a defendant may receive or anticipate an 
unfavorable ruling in state court, foresee a long state appeals 
process, and seek removal to federal court. Once in federal court, 
the defendant moves to certify to the highest state court.”326 Con-
sequently, certification results in outcomes antithetical to a 
foundational purpose of the Erie Doctrine. 
319. See supra Part I.B.
320. These methods are explained in Schaffer & Herr, supra note 13, at
1630–32; see also supra Part I.B.2. 
321. See, e.g., Fiore v. White, 528 U.S. 23, 29 (1999) (certifying to the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court); Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 395–
97 (1988) (certifying to the Virginia Supreme Court); Zant v. Stephens, 456 U.S. 
410, 416–17 (1982) (certifying to the Georgia Supreme Court); Bellotti v. Baird, 
428 U.S. 132, 150–53 (1976) (certifying to the Supreme Judicial Court of Mas-
sachusetts). 
322. Schaffer & Herr, supra note 13, at 1630.
323. Clark, supra note 20, at 1545.
324. Schaffer & Herr, supra note 13, at 1636–37.
325. Cochran, supra note 141, at 204.
326. Id.
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Also, the delay and cost of certification procedures generally 
exceed that of Erie Guesses.327 Some studies have found “that 
the certification process generally causes delays of longer than 
one year with an average being about fifteen months.”328 There-
fore, if certification’s result is generally identical to Erie 
Guesses’, as the study revealed, certification’s delay is unjusti-
fied and unnecessary. Another dilemma is that, at times, certifi-
cation procedures turn state supreme court decisions into mere 
advisory opinions.329 In short, an advisory opinion has no bind-
ing authority and merely informs litigants of how the court 
would rule should a case arise.330 Since Article III’s inception, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that advisory opinions are un-
constitutional and violate the separation of powers.331 
Further, even federal courts with the ability332 to certify 
questions may choose to make an Erie Guess because of particu-
lar factors, including the time and resources certification en-
tails.333 Indeed, the Supreme Court has made clear that certifi-
cation is “not obligatory.”334 Specifically, the Northern District of 
Iowa has explained the complexity that federal courts face when 
327. Coby W. Logan, Certifying Questions to the Arkansas Supreme Court: A
Practical Means for Federal Courts in Clarifying Arkansas State Law, 30 U. 
ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 85, 101 (2007). 
328. Id.
329. Cochran, supra note 141, at 161 (“[I]n practice, certification . . . has re-
sulted in advisory opinions.”). 
330. Advisory Opinion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“A non-
binding statement by a court of its interpretation of the law on a matter sub-
mitted for that purpose.”). 
331. See, e.g., Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. 408, 408–10 (1792) (requiring an ac-
tual dispute between litigants and a substantial likelihood that a judicial deci-
sion will bring about some change or have some effect); Letter from John Jay to 
George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), in 3 THE CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PA-
PERS OF JOHN JAY, 488–89 (Henry P. Johnston ed., 1891) (explaining that advi-
sory opinions would violate the separation of powers because the President 
could ask the executive officers for such an opinion (citing U.S. CONST. art. II, 
§ 2)).
332. Relevantly, Nebraska, Missouri, and South Dakota are on the only
states within the Eighth Circuit that do not allow certified questions to the state 
supreme courts. See supra notes 150–57 and accompanying text. 
333. See, e.g., L. Cohen & Co. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 1419,
1423 (D. Conn. 1986) (noting that routine certification “would impose an unrea-
sonable and unnecessary burden on [the highest courts of the states]”). 
334. Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390–91 (1974).
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determining whether to certify a question of state law to the cor-
responding state court.335 Thus, certification may prove futile for 
federal courts seeking answers to unsettled issues of state law. 
Federal courts also struggle with the fact that state courts 
may rule certification procedures are unconstitutional. For ex-
ample, in Grantham v. Missouri Department of Corrections, the 
Arkansas Supreme Court held Missouri’s certification proce-
dure336 to be unconstitutional because it was held to be outside 
the Court’s jurisdiction.337 Specifically, the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Western District of Missouri certified a ques-
tion to the Missouri Supreme Court pursuant to § 477.004.338 
However, “[f]inding no constitutional jurisdiction,” the Court de-
clined to answer.339 Although proponents emphasize that certifi-
cation “promotes judicial economy because certification short-
circuits state appellate procedure and presents questions di-
rectly to the state’s highest court, it saves time and conserves 
finite state resources,” these dilemmas prove that certification 
can be counterproductive.340  
Lastly, the practicality concerns of the Erie Guess, as the 
study revealed, undermine certification’s purpose. Certifica-
tion’s primary argument against Erie Guesses is that certifica-
tion could never lead to conflicting results between state and fed-
eral law.341 However, such results were extremely rare in the 
335. Rowson v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 866 F. Supp. 1221, 1225 (N.D. Iowa
1994) (noting a complexity of factors a court may consider when determining 
whether to certify a federal question); see also supra notes 160–65 and accom-
panying text. 
336. MO. REV. STAT. § 477.004 (2012).
337. No. 72576, 1990 WL 602159, at *1 (Mo. July 13, 1990).
338. Id.
339. Id.
340. Randall T. Shepard, Is Making State Constitutional Law Through Cer-
tified Questions a Good Idea or Bad Idea?, 38 VAL. U. L. REV. 327, 339 (2004) 
(citing Judith S. Kaye & Kenneth I. Weissman, Interactive Judicial Federalism: 
Certified Questions in New York, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 373 (2000)); see also 
Joshua D. Yount, Taking the Guess Out of the Erie Guess: The Seventh Circuit’s 
Approach to the Certification of Questions to a State’s Highest Court, CIRCUIT 
RIDER, 2012, at 34. See generally Shepard, supra note 340 (providing a detailed 
history of certification throughout the United States since Erie along with a 
well-cited argument advocating for certification to replace the Erie Guess). 
341. Chang, supra note 13, at 267 (“Certification allows federal courts to
avoid Erie problems regarding federalism, forum shopping, and inequitable ad-
ministration of justice.”). 
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study and were vastly overshadowed by outcomes revealing har-
mony between federal and state courts.342 Although almost 
three-quarters of the studied cases reflected “untouched” opin-
ions that potentially could result in inequitable decisions under 
the worst case scenario,343 certification is unlikely to address this 
dilemma. As noted, no data exists regarding why the state su-
preme courts have not addressed these Erie Guesses.344 If the 
states actually desired to reject the issues ascertained in these 
Erie Guesses, but were unable to because of denials of certiorari, 
certification would also likely be futile because the states could 
also reject such questions under the applicable certification pro-
cedures.345 In other words, the state courts are unlikely to deny 
certiorari on cases with which they disagree or wish to change.346 
Therefore, if there really is an inequitable administration of jus-
tice occurring in such “untouched” Erie Guesses, then certifica-
tion is only meaningful if denials of certiorari are the sole rea-
soning for the states’ acquiescence and the corresponding state 
has adopted mandatory certification procedures from the court 
making such Erie Guesses. 
Hence, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s apparent pref-
erence of certification over abstention,347 Erie Guesses are still 
necessary for federal courts involving states that reject certifica-
tion for expediency and cost factors. 
342. See infra Appendix Figure 1.
343. Id.
344. See supra Part III.A.
345. See, e.g., Longview Prod. Co. v. Dubberly, 99 S.W.3d 427, 428 (2003)
(“Certification will only be necessary when our substantive law is unclear on an 
issue ‘which may be determinative of the cause then pending in the certifying 
court and as to which it appears to the certifying court there is no controlling 
precedent in the decisions of the Supreme Court.” (quoting ARK. SUP. CT. R. 6–
8(a)(2))); Wolner v. Mahaska Indus., 325 N.W.2d 39, 41 n.1 (Minn. 1982) (ex-
plaining that certification is appropriate “when there is no controlling precedent 
in the decisions of the supreme court of this state” (quoting MINN. STAT. § 
480.061, subd. 1 (1980))). 
346. See generally Linzer, supra note 189 (describing the meaning of certio-
rari denials). 
347. Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 79 (1997) (“Spec-
ulation by a federal court about the meaning of a state statute in the absence of 
prior state court adjudication is particularly gratuitous when . . . the state 
courts stand willing to address questions of state law on certification from a 
federal court.” (quoting Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 510 
(1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring))). 
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2. Abstention
For similar reasons why certification fails to effectively pro-
mote the Erie Doctrine’s goals, the abstention doctrine also falls 
short. First, abstention inherently carries unnecessary costs and 
delays on the judicial process.348 Under this doctrine: “the par-
ties must leave federal court to initiate a full round of state liti-
gation plus any attendant appeals, and then return to federal 
court for another full round of litigation and appeals.”349 Addi-
tionally, “the state supreme court may not definitively resolve 
the relevant issue, as that court can decline review—undercut-
ting the reason to abstain in the first place.”350 Theoretically, ab-
stention interrupts careful balancing of separation of powers be-
cause it essentially allows judges to decline their jurisdiction.351 
Longstanding tradition holds that the Court has “no more 
right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than 
to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other would be 
treason to the constitution.”352 Abstention presents unnecessary 
delays, costs, and constitutional issues that Erie Guesses avoid 
altogether. 
In sum, the Erie Guess has its roots in long-established prec-
edent upheld by both the United States Supreme Court, lower 
federal courts, and arguably Congress for eighty years. Although 
alternatives to Erie Guesses exist—like abstention and certifica-
tion—the unintended consequences outweigh their potential 
benefit. Therefore, Erie Guesses are still necessary for judicial 
efficiency and are strongly supported by precedent and practical-
ity concerns.  
348. Eisenberg, supra note 129, at 73–74.
349. Id. at 74.
350. Id.
351. See generally George D. Brown, When Federalism and Separation of
Powers Collide-Rethinking Younger Abstention, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 114, 114 
(1990) (“[A] case can be made that the abstention doctrines present . . . a conflict 
between [the Supreme Court’s] vision of federalism and its commitment to the 
separation of powers.”); Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, 
and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 74 (1984) (“[N]either 
total nor partial judge-made abstention is acceptable as a matter of legal process 
and separation of powers.”). 
352. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 264, 403 (1821).
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D. BRIGHTER GUIDELINES: IMPROVING ERIE GUESSES’
ACCURACY, FINALITY, AND CERTAINTY
Ultimately, Erie Guesses allow for appropriate and effective 
federal definitions of state law in overlaps between state and fed-
eral courts. Thus, the Eighth Circuit should continue to use Erie 
Guesses when forced to interpret state law in the absence of 
state decisions. In other words, because the vast majority of 
states within the Eighth Circuit either explicitly validate or im-
plicitly acquiesce to Erie Guesses,353 federal courts should con-
tinue interpreting novel or complex state claims. Notwithstand-
ing such success of the status quo, the study did reveal cases in 
which the Erie Guesses were wrong.354 Hence, some change is 
desirable to avoid inaccurate predictions of state law and confu-
sion regarding what factors federal courts will apply when mak-
ing Erie Guesses.355 Therefore, Eighth Circuit courts should 
adopt the modified four-step analysis articulated in Soto v. Shea-
ley,356 to effectively and accurately predict unresolved state law. 
In the context of whether to recognize a common law tort, for 
example, the approach asks: 
(1) whether the [cause of action] is inherent in, or the natural extension
of, a well-established common law right, (2) whether the [cause of ac-
tion] has been recognized in other common law states, (3) whether
recognition of [the] cause of action will create tension with other appli-
cable laws, and (4) whether such tension is out-weighed by the im-
portance of the additional protections that recognition of the claim
would provide to injured persons.357
This Note’s suggested modified approach would ask the 
same four questions with an additional fifth prong that would 
weigh relevant lower state court decisions from the state that 
the federal court is analyzing.358 This approach will not only al-
low federal courts to more accurately predict state law, but also 
provide foreseeability for state supreme courts and guidance for 
353. See infra Appendix Figure 1, Tables 4–5.
354. See infra Appendix Figure 1, Table 5.
355. See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text (discussing the differ-
ences, although minor, between federal courts within the Eighth Circuit when 
describing relevant factors for Erie Guesses). 
356. 331 F. Supp. 3d 879, 885 (D. Minn. 2018).
357. Id. (quoting Larson v. Wasemiller, 738 N.W.2d 300, 304 (Minn. 2007)).
358. See Comm’r v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967) (noting that in
the absence of a highest state court decision, a federal court should “apply what 
they find to be the state law after giving ‘proper regard’ to relevant rulings of 
other courts of the [s]tate”). 
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federal litigants like the Sotos.359 Additionally, as noted, Erie 
Guesses, established via this five-step approach, are supported 
by precedent,360 Congress,361 and practicality concerns.362  
A main critique of Erie Guesses is that the Supreme Court 
has never decided, outside of dicta, what federal courts should 
consider when predicting state law.363 This suggested approach, 
however, synthesizes influential precedent and effectively pro-
vides clarity to how federal courts should predict state law. The 
first element ensures that the federal court bases its prediction 
on “inherent” common law rights that are not novel to the state 
court. This element conforms with the Supreme Court’s mandate 
in West v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,364 that federal 
courts must consider the “the highest state court’s recent deci-
sions on similar issues.”365 Likewise, the second prong exempli-
fies the Supreme Court’s holding in West that ordered the federal 
court to consider “other jurisdictions’ precedents.”366 The third 
and fourth prong interact with the first prong and allow the fed-
eral court to base its decision not only on past state decisions, 
but also on contemporary and future concerns that the state 
court would not ignore if faced with the unsettled issue. Thus, 
these two prongs also emulate the Supreme Court’s instruction 
to consider “the highest state court’s recent decisions on similar 
issues.”367 The fifth and final prong—regarding relevant lower 
state court opinions from that state—gives teeth to the Supreme 
Court’s declaration in West that a federal court ought not to dis-
regard a “rule of law” announced by an intermediate appellate 
state court “unless [the federal court] is convinced by other per-
359. See supra Introduction.
360. See supra Part III.A.
361. See supra Part III.B.
362. See supra Part III.C.
363. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 20, at 1517 (“Although the Supreme Court’s
opinions contain dicta suggesting that federal courts should employ a predictive 
approach, the Court has neither squarely endorsed that model nor suggested 
that such an approach is the exclusive means that federal courts must employ 
to resolve unsettled questions of state law.”). 
364. 311 U.S. 223, 236–37 (1940).
365. Soto v. Shealey, 331 F. Supp. 3d 879, 885 (D. Minn. 2018) (citing West,
311 U.S. at 236–37). 
366. Id.
367. Id.
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suasive data that the highest court of the state would decide oth-
erwise.”368 This prong would force federal courts, just as state 
courts do, to seriously consider relevant decisions from persua-
sive authority within the state.  
Together, these factors effectively and efficiently provide 
federal courts with instructions that mimic how a state court 
would approach the unsettled issue. By following identical steps 
as the corresponding state court, federal courts will be able to 
more accurately predict how the state court would resolve the 
issue. Accurate Erie Guesses effectuate the Erie Doctrine’s goal 
of avoiding the “inequitable administration of the laws”369 be-
cause federal outcomes will reflect state outcomes and vice versa. 
Accuracy, in turn, will lead to finality because state courts will 
not be as likely to contradict the federal courts’ Erie Guesses. 
Finality will reduce uncertainty because state court litigants will 
have the ability to look towards federal courts for guidance. Per-
haps most importantly, this concrete “checklist” will guide liti-
gants entering federal courts and reduce the risk of forum shop-
ping370 because litigants will know that federal courts are likely 
to treat their claims just as state courts would. In all, these fac-
tors represent the best solution to Erie Guesses’ current ambiv-
alent state and will effectively carry out the Erie Doctrine’s 
goals. 
Although this suggested approach is tailored specifically for 
federal courts determining whether to recognize a new cause of 
action, it has the potential to guide courts in other contexts 
where Erie Guesses arise.371 For example, Erie Guesses predict-
ing how state courts will define elements of an existing cause of 
action372 or rule on novel causes of defenses373 would adopt a sim-
368. West, 311 U.S. at 237; see also New York Life Ins. Co. v. Stoner, 109
F.2d 874, 878 (8th Cir.) rev’d, 311 U.S. 464 (1940) (stating that “[w]e are not
bound to follow the decisions and reasoning of the intermediate appellate courts
of Missouri”).
369. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
370. Id. (noting that reducing forum shopping is one of Erie’s two goals).
371. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (noting that Erie Guesses in-
clude federal predictions of how state courts will rule on novel causes of action, 
novel defenses, and even whether state precedent will be overruled). 
372. See supra notes 199–205 and accompanying text (explaining how Erie
Guesses have been used to establish elements of existing causes of action). 
373. See supra notes 98–110 and accompanying text (explaining how Erie
Guesses have been used to predict whether a state court would recognize novel 
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ilar test with minor changes. The fifth prong would remain iden-
tical for both contexts and the other prongs would simply change 
“cause of action” to “elements” for the former and “cause of de-
fense” for the latter. Another context involving Erie Guesses—
predicting whether a state court would overrule its prece-
dent374—is more difficult to analyze under this suggested ap-
proach. The other prongs’ focuses remain valuable, but the fed-
eral court would have to change the “cause of action” language 
to something along the broad lines of the “federal court’s deci-
sion.” For example, the second prong would change from whether 
the cause of action has been recognized in other common law 
states to whether the federal court’s decision has been recognized 
in other common law states. These slight modifications would 
allow the suggested approach not only to improve Erie Guesses 
within limited contexts, but also enhance all Erie Guesses no 
matter what specific issue they predict. 
  CONCLUSION  
This Note describes and analyzes the Erie Doctrine with an 
emphasis on the Erie Guess. It advocates for a focus on the Erie 
Doctrine’s history, which resoundingly supports the Erie Guess 
when the highest state court has not ruled on the state law issue 
and there are no persuasive, analogous state cases. To provide 
clarity for both courts and litigants, this Note advocates for a 
five-step approach that is supported by both precedent and prac-
ticality concerns. The approach will strengthen the relationship 
between federal and state courts and will provide notice to those, 
like the Sotos,375 of how a federal court will treat their claim. In 
all, the five-step approach walks the thin line between avoiding 
establishing federal general common law and providing reason-
able and contemporary interpretations of unsettled state law. 
causes of defenses). 
374. See supra notes 114–25 and accompanying text (discussing how Erie
Guesses have been used to predict whether a state court would overrule is prec-
edent). 
375. See supra Introduction.
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APPENDIX 
Figure 1. State Reactions to Erie Guesses Within the 
Eighth Circuit 
Percentages are based on a random 100 cases that involved Erie Guesses. 
Table 1. State Tendencies (Percentages) 
Validating  
(25% or Greater) 
Untouching  
(Greater than 75%) 
Rejecting  
(Greater than 15%) 
Minnesota (50%) Iowa (77.78%) Missouri (15.79%) 
Nebraska (37.5%) North Dakota (90%) 
Arkansas (25%) South Dakota (80%) 
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Table 2. State Tendencies (Raw Numbers) 
State Ark. Iowa Minn. Mo. Neb. N.D. S.D. Total 
Validated 4 4 7 2 3 0 3 23 
Untouched 11 14 7 14 5 9 12 72 
Rejected 1 0 0 3 0 1 0 5 
Total 16 18 14 19 8 10 15 100 
Table 3. Federal Court Tendencies Regarding How State 
Courts “Respond” (Raw Numbers and Case List for Dis-
trict Courts) 
Court Validated376 Untouched 
8th Cir.377 16 27378 
E.D. Ark. 0 1379 
W.D. Ark. 0 3380 
N.D. Iowa 2 7381 
S.D. Iowa 1 3382 
D. Minn. 2 2383 
E.D. Mo. 0 7384 
W.D. Mo. 0 2385 
D. Neb. 1 4386 
D.N.D. 0 8387 
D.S.D. 1 8388 
Total 23  72 
376. See infra Table 4.
377. The Eighth Circuit itself was the only court that state courts re-
jected. See infra Table 5. 
378. See infra Table 6.
379.  Meredith v. Buchman, 101 F. Supp. 2d 764, 767 (E.D. Ark. 2000).
380.  3A Composites USA, Inc. v. United Indus., No. 5:14-CV-5147, 2015 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 154115, at *4 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 4, 2015);  Crussell v. Electrolux 
Home Prods., 499 F. Supp. 2d 1137, 1138–39 (W.D. Ark. 2007);  Int’l Paper Co. 
v. McI Worldcom Network Servs., 202 F. Supp. 2d 895, 903 (W.D. Ark. 2002).
381.  United States v. Burnside, No. CR17-2094-LTS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
66545, at *9 (N.D. Iowa Apr. 20, 2018);  Cedar Rapids Lodge & Suites, LLC v. 
JFS Dev., Inc., No. 09-CV-175-LRR, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42273, at *1 (N.D. 
Iowa Apr. 29, 2010);  Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Sand Livestock Sys., No. C04-
4028-PAZ, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12276, at *18 (N.D. Iowa June 22, 2005); 
MidAmerican Energy Co. v. Great Am. Ins., 171 F. Supp. 2d 835, 848 (N.D. Iowa 
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2001); Prudential Ins. of Am. v. Rand & Reed Powers P’ship, 972 F. Supp. 1194, 
1201 (N.D. Iowa 1997);  Olympus Aluminum Prods. v. Kehm Enters., 930 F. 
Supp. 1295, 1311 (N.D. Iowa 1996);  Rowson v. Kawasaki Heavy Indus., 866 F. 
Supp. 1221, 1232 (N.D. Iowa 1994). 
382. Mahony v. Universal Pediatric Servs., 753 F. Supp. 2d 839, 852 n.8
(S.D. Iowa 2010);  Weitz Co. LLC v. Lloyd’s of London, No. 4:04-CV-90353-TJS, 
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148063, at *15–17 (S.D. Iowa Dec. 20, 2010); Jackson v. 
Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp. 1490, 1494 (S.D. Iowa 1991). 
383. St. Paul v. FMC Corp., No. 3-89-0466, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18142,
*22–24 (D. Minn. Feb. 26, 1990);  Meyer v. Tenvoorde Motor Co., 714 F. Supp.
991, 995–96 (D. Minn. 1989).
384.  Jo Ann Howard & Assocs., P.C. v. Cassity, No. 4:09CV01252 ERW, 2012
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128754, at *23–24 (E.D. Mo. Sep. 11, 2012); Auto Owners Ins. 
v. Biegel Refrigeration & Elec. Co., 659 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1054 (E.D. Mo. 2009);
Auto-Owners Ins. v. Mid-America Piping, No. 4:07-CV-00394, 2008 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26038, at *5 (E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2008);  Zoltek Corp. v. Structural Poly-
mer Grp., No. 4:08-CV-460 (CEJ), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 92714, at *10 (E.D.
Mo. Nov. 13, 2008);  Harris v. Parkway Sch. Dist., No. 4:07-CV-579 (JCH), 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96702, at *4–6 (E.D. Mo. June 22, 2007);  Self v. Equilon En-
ters., No. 4:00CV1903 TIA, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17288, at *29–31 (E.D. Mo.
Mar. 30, 2005);  Kraus v. Celotex Corp., 925 F. Supp. 646, 651–53 (E.D. Mo.
1996).
385. Trilogy Dev. Co. v. BB Syndication Servs. (In re Trilogy Dev. Co.), 437
B.R. 683, 686–87 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2010);  Harber v. Altec Indus., 812 F. Supp. 
954, 957 (W.D. Mo. 1993). 
386. Uribe v. Sofamor, S.N.C., 8:95CV464, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18854, at
*53–54 (D. Neb. Aug. 16, 1999); Lincoln Benefit Life Co. v. Edwards, 45 F.
Supp. 2d 722, 756 (D. Neb. 1999);  Cudahy Co. v. Am. Labs., Inc., 313 F. Supp.
1339, 1342 (D. Neb. 1970);  Platte v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 6 F.R.D. 475,
485 (D. Neb. 1946).
387.  S & W Mobile Home & Rv Park, LLC v. B&D Excavating & Under-
ground, LLC, No. 1-17-cv-9, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 113924, at *27 n.8 (D.N.D. 
July 21, 2017);  Hoff v. Elkhorn Bar, 613 F. Supp. 2d 1146, 1156–57 (D.N.D. 
2009);  Albers v. Deere & Co., 599 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1152 (D.N.D. 2008); 
Dakota W. Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc’y, 532 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1114 (D.N.D. 
2008);  Acuity v. N. Cent. Video, LLLP, No. 1:05-cv-010, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
33540, at *51 (D.N.D. May 7, 2007);  Hueske v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 627 
F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1064 (D.N.D. 2007);  Atkinson v. McLaughlin, 462 F. Supp. 2d
1038, 1048–50 (D.N.D. 2006);  Farmer’s Union Cent. Exch., Inc. v. Reliance Ins.
Co., 675 F. Supp. 1534, 1536 (D.N.D. 1987).
388.  Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D. v. W. Showcase Homes, Inc., No. 4:16-CV-
04118-VLD, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 208389, at *60 (D.S.D. Dec. 11, 2018); 
Klynsma v. Hydradyne, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133275, at *14–15 (D.S.D. Sep. 
30, 2015);  O’Daniel v. Hartford Life Ins., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188540, at *90 
(D.S.D. Sept. 20, 2013);  Am. Gen. Life Ins. v. Jenson, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
33409, at *39 (D.S.D. Mar. 12, 2012);  Nw. Pub. Serv. v. Union Carbide Corp., 
115 F. Supp. 2d 1164, 1166 (D.S.D. 2000);  Warner ex rel. Brown v. Youth Servs. 
Int’l of S.D., Inc., 89 F. Supp. 2d 1095, 1100 (D.S.D. 2000);  Tokley v. State 
Farm Ins. Cos., 782 F. Supp. 1375, 1377 (D.S.D. 1992); Yarrow v. Sterling Drug, 
Inc., 263 F. Supp. 159, 161 (D.S.D. 1967). 
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Table 4. Validated Erie Guesses (Case List) 
Erie Guess Validated by 
Gillette Dairy, Inc. v. Mallard Mfg. 
Corp., 707 F.2d 351 (8th Cir. 1983) 
Ames v. Hehner, 
435 N.W.2d 869, 874 (Neb. 1989) 
Lindsay Mfg. Co. v. Hartford Acci-
dent & Indem. Co., 118 F.3d 1263, 
1268 (8th Cir. 1997) 
Herman Bros. v. Great W. Cas. Co., 
582 N.W.2d 328, 334 (Neb. 1998) 
Hegg v. United States, 817 F.2d 
1328, 1330 (8th Cir. 1987) 
Bird v. Econ. Brick Homes, Inc.,  
498 N.W.2d 408, 409 (Iowa 1993) 
First Colony Life Ins. v. Berube,  
130 F.3d 827, 829 (8th Cir. 1997) 
In re Smid, 
756 N.W.2d 1, 14 (S.D. 2008) 
Van Den Hul v. Baltic Farmers Ele-
vator Co., 716 F.2d 504, 508 (8th 
Cir. 1983) 
Clark Cty. v. Sioux Equip. Corp., 
753 N.W.2d 406, 411 (S.D. 2008) 
Jackson v. Anchor Packing Co.,  
994 F.2d 1295, 1301 (8th Cir. 1993) 
Chavers v. GMC, 
349 Ark. 550, 562 (Ark. 2002) 
Kifer v. Liberty Mut. Ins.,  
777 F.2d 1325, 1329 (8th Cir. 1985) 
Burkett v. PPG Indus., 
740 S.W.2d 621, 624 (Ark. 1987) 
Bass v. GMC,  
150 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 1998) 
Uxa v. Marconi, 
128 S.W.3d 121, 129 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2003) 
Toney v. WCCO TV,  
85 F.3d 383, 389–90 (8th Cir. 1996) 
Schlieman v. Gannett Minn. Broad., 
Inc., 637 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2001) 
Taylor v. Ark. La. Gas Co.,  
793 F.2d 189 (8th Cir. 1986) 
Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Taylor, 
858 S.W.2d 88, 89 (Ark. 1993) 
Luster v. Retail Credit Co.,  
575 F.2d 609, 613 (8th Cir. 1978) 
Roeben v. BG Excelsior Ltd. P’ship, 
344 S.W.3d 93, 98 (Ark. Ct. App. 
2009) 
Ventura v. Titan Sports,  
65 F.3d 725, 729 (8th Cir. 1995) 
Afremov v. Amplatz, 
No. A09-1157, 2010 Minn. App. Un-
pub. LEXIS 470, at *21 (Minn. Ct. 
App. 2010) 
Leonard v. Dorsey & Whitney, 553 
F.3d 609 (8th Cir. 2009)
In re Syngenta Litig., 
2016 Minn. Dist. LEXIS 6, at *33–
34 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 2016) 
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Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co. v. Ppg 
Indus., 223 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 
2000) 
N. States Power Co. v. GE,
No. A16-1687, 2017 Minn. App. Un-
pub. LEXIS 603, at *14–15 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2017)
Soo L.R. Co. v. Fruehauf Corp.,  
547 F.2d 1365, 1373 (8th Cir. 1977) 
Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imps., Inc., 
262 N.W.2d 349, 356 n.11 (Minn. 
1977) 
Bergstreser v. Mitchell,  
577 F.2d 22, 25 (8th Cir. 1978) 
Lough v. Rolla Women’s Clinic, Inc., 
866 S.W.2d 851, 853 (Mo. 1993) 
McCabe v. Macaulay,  
551 F. Supp. 2d 771, 785 (N.D. Iowa 
2007) 
Godfrey v. State,  
898 N.W.2d 844, 847, 856 (Iowa 
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